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Amongst Africa's 3rd wave democracies, Zambia (along with Benin) has the longest line of 
uninterrupted competitive elections, and thus offers a critical test of recent arguments in 
political science about the role of elections in advancing the process of democratization. 
Many of these 3rd wave democracies have managed to maintain competitive elections, but 
without becoming full democracies. Scholars provide two different interpretations of this 
phenomenon.  On one hand, scholars such as Carothers (2002:14), Levitsky and Way 
(2005:22), Schedler (2002) and Diamond (2002:32) argue that there is no underlying trend 
whereby countries are slowly moving, or transiting toward democracy or full democracy and 
that countries are developing into a new form of regime.  There is no consensus over how to 
label this new regime form (hybrid regimes, grey zone, illiberal democracies, semi 
democracies etc...). Lindberg on the other hand, has focussed on the role of elections and 
argues that repeated elections actually promote democratic growth. The purpose of this 
study is to assess if democratic values in Zambia have deepened with repeated elections as 
suggested by Staffan Lindberg. If any country should exhibit the overtime changes that 
Lindberg attributes to repeated elections, it should be Zambia because of the country’s long 
line of uninterrupted competitive elections. 
 
More specifically, the study examines whether a within country, over time analysis of 
Zambia, reveal that Zambia is in fact becoming more democratic. The study assesses 
democratic quality in Zambia using sub-concepts of participation, competition, judicial 
autonomy, legislative autonomy, executive power, openness, and popular legitimacy of 
democracy. The data used in this study is mainly cross national data and public opinion data 
from Freedom House, Polity, Heritage House's, Bertelsman, World Bank Institute and 
Afrobarometer. In addition, country reports from Media Institute of Southern Africa, 
Amnesty international, Human Rights Watch, United Nations Human Rights, World Bank, 
Legal Resource Foundation Zambia and Transparency International among other 
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The within country, over time analysis of democratic quality in Zambia reveals that Zambia is 
not becoming more democratic. The overall quality of democracy in Zambia has not 
improved overtime. Of the seven (7) sub-concepts used to measure democratic quality 
namely participation, competition, judicial autonomy, legislative autonomy, executive 
power, openness, and popular legitimacy of democracy, only the indicator of political 
participation under the broader concept of participation showed signs of minor progress. 
Although a major setback with the overall assessment of the sub concept of participation 
was revealed. There has not been any progress and therefore no change recorded with 
regards competition, judicial autonomy and executive power. Minor setbacks were 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem and Relevance 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess if democracy in Zambia has deepened, with repeated 
elections, as suggested by the theory of democratization by elections, as advanced by 
Staffan Lindberg1. Zambia is amongst the countries that moved away from one party 
authoritarian rule in the post 1989 period. Many of these countries like Zambia have 
managed to maintain competitive elections, but without becoming full democracies (hybrid 
regimes, grey zone, illiberal democracies, semi democracies etc...). Scholars provide two 
different interpretations of this phenomenon. On one hand, scholars such as Carothers 
(2002:14), state that countries should not be analysed, as being on ‘way stations to liberal 
democracy’ but should be understood as having taken alternative directions. Levitsky and 
Way (2005:22) in support, suggest that these countries are developing into a new regime 
form called electoral authoritarianism, while Schedler (2002) referred to them as 
competitive authoritarianism. Diamond (2002:32), described these nations as electoral 
autocracies and classified Zambia as an ambiguous regime. The basic argument is that there 
is no underlying trend whereby countries are slowly moving, or transiting toward democracy 
or full democracy. In fact, they argue that these counties are developing into a new form of 
political regime that is neither democratic, nor wholly authoritarian.  
 
Lindberg on the other hand, has focussed on the role of elections and argues that repeated 
elections actually promote democratic growth. This is unlike the above mentioned scholars, 
who argue that repeated elections are not moving these countries forward in any 
democratic direction. Lindberg’s study examines the relationship between elections and 
                                                     
1 Important Note; The study is a within country enquiry which provides an in-depth overtime analysis of 
democratic quality in Zambia. A fourteen year time frame (1996-2010) is used for the purposes of this research, 
in order to capture the four consecutive elections (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2008). The end date for data 
collection was therefore before the most recent election held on 20
th
 September 2011. Also, after the end 
date for data collection second Republican President FTJ Chiluba who had been at the centre of corruption 














2 | P a g e  
 
level of democracy and provides evidence after compiling a dataset that included 
information on 284 elections in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2006, that repeated 
elections in fact improve the quality of democracy, as measured by data on civil liberties. 
According to Lindberg (2006: xi) there is a ‘strong correlation between elections and 
democratic growth’. Lindberg’s analysis shows that the inception of multiparty elections in a 
country instigates liberalization and that ‘repeating electoral activities create incentives for 
political actors, by fostering the expansion and deepening of democratic qualities in the 
society’. Therefore, a sequence of elections not only contributes to increasing the quality of 
a ‘political regime’2 but also ‘broadens and deepens civil liberties in the society’ (ibid).   
 
Repetitive elections, even when flawed, are one of the important causal factor in 
democratisation as ‘flawed electoral experiences involving manipulation, rigging, and 
violence can be efficient in provoking actors to work harder to increase civil liberties in 
society’ (Lindberg 2006:121). According to Lindberg (2006:3) regime transitions unfold in 
stages, from founding elections that signify the genesis of a new democratic phase. 
Democracy in Africa, tends to take root after a sequence of three electoral cycles and the 
longer an uninterrupted series of elections a country has, the more its society will become 
‘imbued with democratic qualities’ (Lindberg 2006:99). Increases in democratic qualities, are 
therefore effects of holding elections. This is because elections have a ‘self-reinforcing 
power’3. According to Lindberg (2006:109) elections are a causal factor in democratization 
rather than, as often assumed, merely a reflection of democracy. 
 
1.2 Research Question  
 
Zambia provides a critical case with which to explore this controversy.  It has been labelled 
variously as a hybrid regime, grey zone country, ambiguous regime and most recently by 
                                                     
2 Regimes are the rules governing the distribution of power and the relationships between the agents of power 
in politics. According to Lindberg (2006:6) regime change is about breaking the old patterns and establishing 
new ones even if this alteration has to occur in the context of the old structure and in the face of established 
patterns of behaviour.  
 
3
 Increases in democratic elections due to the experience accumulated over several electoral cycles leads to 
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Levitsky and Way (2010) as a competitive authoritarian regime. It is viewed by some scholars 
as a country that has stopped moving towards democracy. Lindberg’s thesis alternatively 
provides renewed hope for countries like Zambia, whose progress towards democratic 
growth has been a matter of doubt. Lindberg’s thesis provides a new lens of analysing 
democratic growth in Zambia. The country further provides a critical case, because it is not 
only a single case test of the Lindberg hypothesis, but also a useful case that can illustrate 
the Lindberg thesis, as it has had a series of uninterrupted elections, which according to 
Lindberg (2006:109) are a necessary condition for democratic growth.  
 
It would therefore be important, to assess if Zambia conforms to Lindberg’s hypothesis and 
such is the intention of this study. Lindberg’s study raises a very interesting topic that should 
be subjected to further scrutiny. His study uses a large data set to make cross national 
comparison. This raises the need to make a more country specific longitudinal enquiry, to 
asses if the statistical evidence, is indeed reflected overtime in society’s actual democratic 
qualities. The statistical evidence as shown by Freedom House, in fact, suggests that there is 
a gradual, over time positive trend in political rights in Zambia (refer to Table 1 below). The 
question that this raises therefore and which is partly the essence of the study is that, if one 
looked deeper beyond the statistics, into the Zambian society, are things really getting 
better(Discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, Section 3.1). Put differently there appears 
to have been overtime democratic growth in Zambia. This study will therefore, add value to 
the state of knowledge, with regards to the relationship between elections and increases in 
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Table 1: Freedom House Data Ranking Zambia 
 
 
Political Rights (PR) and Civil Rights (CL) in Zambia from 1996-2009 
 
Year PR CL Status (Freedom 
House) 
1996-1997 5 4 Partly Free 
1997-1998 5 4 Partly Free 
1998-1999 5 4 Partly Free 
1999-2000 5 4 Partly Free 
2000-2001 5 4 Partly Free 
2001-2002 5 4 Partly Free 
2003* 4* 4 Partly Free 
2004 4 4 Partly Free 
2005 4 4 Partly Free 
2006 4 4 Partly Free 
2007 3 4 Partly Free 
2008 3 4 Partly Free 
2009 3 3 Partly Free 
2010 3 4 Partly Free 
*Source Freedom House-‘Freedom in the world rankings’ 
*Countries are ranked on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 representing the 
lowest level of freedom 
* In 2003* Zambia's political rights rating improved from 5 to 4 due to changes in the survey methodology. 
 
1.2.1 Key Research Question  
 
1.  Does a within country, over time analysis of Zambia reveal that Zambia is becoming more 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
Literature that focuses on democracy and democratization reveals a distinct division among 
scholars. There are those scholars that have prescribed democracy via the transition route. 
While others have criticised the transitional paradigm and concluded, over the years, that 
these transitions have stalled. These scholars question whether the image of democratic 
transition and democratization can be used forever.  They argue that once you get to a 
certain point4 and the country is not yet a democracy, it would be incorrect to keep 
describing it as ‘in transition to democracy’.  They further contend that at that point, 
a country may be consolidating into a new type of regime that is neither democratic nor 
wholly authoritarian. Lindberg on the other hand, disputed the fact that transitions have 
stalled and provides evidence that, repeated elections have actually promoted democratic 
growth in these countries. Lindberg’s assertion of democratic growth with repeated 
elections can be described as democratization by election. This literature review, elaborates 
on the different perspectives, provided by scholars, on the subject of democracy and 
democratic growth and is thus arranged into three sections namely transition paradigm, 
counter transitional paradigm and democratization by elections.  
 
2.1.1 Transition Paradigm 
 
Transition theorists, hold the view that the process of democratisation, is supposed to move 
from authoritarian rule to democratic consolidation, where aspects in between present a 
transition to the final process of democratic consolidation. Transitional theory is 
synonymous with the ‘third wave5’ of democratization, which was inspired by the work of 
                                                     
4
 Usually  the 3rd or 4th election 
5
 The term “wave of democratization”  refers to the transitional movement of states from non democratic to 
democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly out number transitions in 
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Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter in their study of Southern Europe and Latin 
America. Scholars such as Bratton and van de Walle (1997) have pointed to the strength of 
civil society, as an important factor in the democratic transitions of the 1990s. Others such 
as Lawson (1999:2) backed the democratic transition scholars and suggested that two 
consecutive democratic elections often marked the end of this transition and consequently 
marked the beginning of consolidation. 
 
Transitions were viewed as liberalization where the authoritarian government collapsed 
(Linz 1975:184-5). Cheibub et al. (1996) also embraced the transitional approach in their 
classification of regimes as democracies and dictatorships. Huntington (1991:11) proposed a 
dichotomous approach, in his study on democratization in the late twentieth century, which 
encompasses transitions from a nondemocratic regime to a democratic one. Other 
proponents of the transitional paradigm include scholars such as Alvarez et al. (1996) who 
analysed factors that contribute to successful transitions. Geddes (1999:115) provides 
evidence that democracy is more likely in more developed countries and that regime 
transitions of all kinds are more likely during economic downturns. The concept of transition 
was originally developed to describe something very specific, but gradually came to be used 
to describe a whole range of countries, like Zambia, even once they were in their 2nd and 
3rd electoral cycles. Diamond (2002:33) emphasises that every step toward this political 
liberalization matters, both for the prospect of a transition to democracy and for the quality 
of political life. Lindberg’s theory ascribes to the transitional approach, as he states that a 
repeated sequence of elections leads to democratic growth. States with authoritarian 
tendencies become more democratic as they repeat elections. Aspects of holding elections 
therefore, represent positive steps through the transition process towards the ultimate state 
of democratic consolidation. 
 
The literature on Transitional Paradigm presents varying opinions of what constitutes a 
successful transition from Huntington’s two consecutive democratic elections to Lindberg’s 
sequence of repeated elections. Despite this, one area of commonality is that the process of 
democratisation is supposed to move from authoritarian rule to democratic consolidation, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Southern Europe, expanded to South America in the late 1970s and early 1980s , it reached Asia and eventually 
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where the former presents a higher and more preferred state of democracy than the latter. 
Zambia can therefore be generally viewed as having gone through the transitional process or 
at least should be at an advanced stage to a point where democracy should flourish. 
 
2.1.2 Counter Transitional Paradigm 
 
The criticism of the transition approach is provided by those who argue that transitions have 
stalled. These scholars question whether the image of democratic transition and 
democratization can be used forever.  They argue that once you get to a certain point and 
the country is not yet a democracy, it would be incorrect to keep describing it as ‘in 
transition to democracy’.  They content that at that point, a country may be consolidating 
into a new type of regime that is neither democratic nor wholly authoritarian. Scholars such 
as Carothers (2002:6) suggest that the transitional theory was only ‘useful during a time of 
momentous and often surprising political upheaval in the world’ but concludes that it has 
become clear that reality is no longer conforming to the model. The transition paradigm was 
a ‘product of a certain time’ which is associated with the third wave and that time has now 
passed.  
 
As analysed by Carothers, the political trajectories of most third-wave countries call into 
serious doubt the transition paradigm. This is apparent if we revisit the major assumptions 
underlying the paradigm. For instance, the almost automatic assumption of democracy 
promoters during the peak years of the third wave that any country moving away from 
dictatorship was ‘in transition to democracy’ has often been inaccurate and misleading. 
Carothers concludes that some of those countries have hardly democratized at all and 
suggests that many have taken on a ‘smattering of democratic features but show few signs 
of democratizing much further and are certainly not following any predictable 
democratization script’ (Carothers 2002:14). 
 
Democracy promoters in the 1980s and 1990s, underestimated the complications that 
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could succeed anywhere, and could do so quickly (Carothers 2007:24). According to 
Carothers, many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling 
‘transitional’ are not in transition to democracy, and of the ‘democratic transitions that are 
under way, more than a few are not following the model’. He further observes that ‘sticking 
with the paradigm beyond its useful life is retarding evolution in the field of democratic 
assistance and is leading policy makers astray in other ways’. It is time to recognize that the 
transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness and to look for a better lens (Carothers 
2002:6).  
 
Carothers suggests that countries such as Zambia, should not be analysed as being on a ‘way 
stations to liberal democracy’ but should be understood as having taken alternative 
directions (Carothers 2002:14). Carothers (2002:18) observes that what is often thought of 
as an uneasy, precarious middle ground between ‘full-fledged democracy’ and ‘outright 
dictatorship’ is actually the most common political condition today of countries in the 
developing world and the postcommunist world. Carothers (2002:18) advocates that the 
seemingly continual surprise and disappointment that Western political analysts express, 
over the very frequent falling short of democracy in ‘transitional countries’, should be 
replaced with realistic expectations about the likely patterns of political life in these 
countries.  
 
Carothers (2002:20) recommends, that it is necessary for ‘democracy activists to move on to 
new frameworks, new debates, and perhaps eventually a new paradigm of political change, 
one suited to the landscape of today, not the lingering hopes of an earlier era’. The assumed 
sequence of stages of democratization is defied by the record of experience. Carothers 
supports his argument by giving an example of what he views as some of the most 
encouraging cases of democratization in recent years namely Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Mexico. He argues that these countries did not go through the paradigmatic process of 
democratic breakthrough, followed rapidly by national elections and a new democratic 
institutional framework (Carothers 2002:15). Another example is Nepal which has held many 
multiparty elections since 1990 and experienced frequent alternation of power. Yet the 
Nepalese public remains highly disaffected from the political system and there is little real 













9 | P a g e  
 
 
Therefore, according to Carothers the assumption of achieving democratic legitimacy in new 
governments, continuous deepening of political participation and democratic accountability 
through regular, genuine elections has often come up short. Carothers notes that in many 
‘transitional countries’, reasonably regular, genuine elections are held but political 
participation beyond voting remains ‘shallow and governmental accountability is weak’. He 
further emphasises that, these disappointments do not mean that elections are pointless in 
such countries or that, the international community should not continue to push for free and 
fair elections, but instead recommends that greatly reduced expectations are in order as to 
what elections will accomplish as ‘generators of deep reaching democratic change’.  
 
Also adding to the criticism of the transition paradigm is Levitsky and Way (2005:22) who 
argue that, the process towards consolidation had hit a grey-zone. The movement towards 
democratic consolidation had unexpectedly crystallised into another form.  According to 
Levitsky and Way in much of Africa, the former Soviet Union, and in parts of Central and 
South-Eastern Europe, East Asia, and the Americas, new regimes combined electoral 
competition with varying degrees of authoritarianism. Therefore countries such as Zambia 
have hit a grey-zone and combine electoral competition with varying degrees of 
authoritarianism.  
 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997:64) concluded that Africa was reverting to “an institutional 
legacy of ‘big man’ rule and the electoral alteration of leaders were again becoming 
‘abnormal’ by all indications. Other scholars, such as Diamond and Plattner (1999:169) in 
their analysis of the transitional process, concluded that second elections were merely 
‘transitions without change ‘as in the case of Zambia. Added to this debate was Cowen and 
Laakso (2002: 23) contribution which suggested that ruling party domination coupled with 
voter apathy, had contributed to the stagnation of transitions. The general view of these 
scholars was that regimes were not democratising as had been earlier predicted.  
 
Sandbrook’s (1996) study of six African countries (Ghana, Mali, Niger, Zambia, Tanzania and 
Madagascar) concluded that countries were in transition without consolidation. The reasons 
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were suffering harassment, arrest, and in some cases, violent attacks, electoral fraud, unfair 
media access, and abuse of state resources, which skewed the playing field heavily in favour 
of incumbents. There was some competition but this mostly related to elections hence 
scholars labelled these countries. Levisty and Way preferred to label these countries as 
‘competitive authoritarian regimes’6. Diamond (2002:24) used the term ‘pseudodemocracy’7. 
Brown and Timberman (1998: 14) used the term ‘nascent democracy’ when referring to 
Cambodia. Kenya was said to be in a state of ‘arrested democratic consolidation’ (Harbeson 
1998: 162) whereas Zambia was described as ‘stuck in transition’ (Rakner and Svasand 2005). 
Teshome (2008) in his study of the democratization process in Africa and multi-party 
elections concluded that transitions had resulted into ‘limited’ democracies. Where 
transitions failed to bring about democracy, countries were generally described as ‘stalled,’ 
‘protracted’ or ‘flawed’. 
 
According to Diamond (2002:24) these counties were deliberately stalling in transition, in 
that the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral 
competition, ‘masked the reality of authoritarian domination’. Many autocrats learned that 
they could maintain their international standing by holding multiparty elections without 
democratizing. Thus according to Levitsky and Way (2005:30) in countries such as 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Togo, as well as in Kenya from 1991 until 2002, autocratic 
governments remained in power via competitive authoritarianism.  
 
The literature review, as presented by those opposed to the transitional paradigm seems to 
suggest that countries such as Zambia have not democratized but have instead taken 
another form i.e. hit a grey –zone. This is the challenge that arises when trying to assess 
Zambia’s progress towards democratization. As alluded above, some scholars such as 
Diamond (2002:32) have classified Zambia as an ambiguous regime, while others such as 
                                                     
6
 Levitsky and Way define these as civilian regimes in which democratic institutions exist and permit meaningful 
competition for power, but where the political playing field is so heavily tilted in favour of incumbents that the 
regime cannot be labelled democratic. 
 
7
 Pseudo-democracy is a system where incumbent parties maintain a tight control on politics in a hegemonic 
fashion by manipulating constitutions and other governmental and political institutions to exploit and harass 
opposition groups and the civil societies (Huntington 1993: 182-187). In ‘pseudo democracies’, ‘the existence of 
formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks the reality of 
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Carothers (2002:14) suggest that countries should not be analysed as being on ‘way stations 
to liberal democracy’ but should be understood as having taken alternative directions. This 
raises the question of whether democratic growth has really stalled in Zambia. 
 
2.1.3 Democratization by elections 
 
Lindberg reinforces the transitional paradigm by providing evidence contrary to the critics of 
the paradigm. Lindberg refutes claims that countries have indeed stalled or protracted and 
instead shows that there is no general negative trend in either the frequency or the quality 
of elections in Africa and that elections are neither ‘the end of a transition process towards 
democracy nor merely formal procedures’ (Lindberg 2006:xi).  According to Lindberg (2006: 
xi) there is a ‘strong correlation between elections and democratic growth’. Lindberg’s 
analysis shows that the inception of multiparty elections in a country instigates liberalization 
and that ‘repeating electoral activities create incentives for political actors by fostering the 
expansion and deepening of democratic qualities in the society’. This finding, builds on 
earlier work done by Rustow (1970) who argued that democratic behaviour produces 
democratic values and that it is not democratic values that produce democratic behaviour 
(ibid). Therefore the mere act of a country having repeated elections (democratic behaviour) 
leads to inculcation of democratic values among its citizens and political actors. Therefore a 
sequence of elections not only contributes to increasing the quality of a ‘political regime’ but 
also ‘broadens and deepens civil liberties in the society’ (ibid).   
 
Lindberg’s theory can be summarised into five basic assumptions. Firstly repetitive elections, 
even when flawed, are one of the important causal factors in democratisation. Secondly 
‘flawed electoral experiences involving manipulation, rigging, and violence can be efficient in 
provoking actors to work harder to increase civil liberties in society’ (Lindberg 2006:121). 
Thirdly, according to Lindberg (2006:3) regime transitions unfold in stages from founding 
elections that signify the genesis of a new democratic phase. Democracy in Africa tends to 
take root after a sequence of three electoral cycles and the longer an uninterrupted series of 
elections a country has, the more its society will become ‘imbued with democratic qualities’ 
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qualities are therefore effects of holding elections because elections have a ‘self-reinforcing 
power’. According to Lindberg (2006:109) elections are a causal factor in democratization 
rather than, as often assumed, merely a reflection of democracy.  
 
Zambia therefore provides a good case, as it has had a series of five uninterrupted elections 
on one hand, while on the other hand it is seen by some scholars as a hybrid regime that has 
stopped moving towards democracy.  Lindberg’s thesis therefore provides renewed hope for 
countries like Zambia whose progress towards democratic growth has been a matter of 
doubt. Contrary to Lindberg’s thesis, Carothers and others argue that regular elections do 
not lead to democratic growth because political participation remains shallow and 
governmental accountability is weak. The conflicting view presented by the existing 
literature on democracy, provides the platform for further inquiry into Zambia which 
appears to lie in the middle of these important strands of thought in the study of new 
democracies.   
 
Although Lindberg’s theory is in essence part of transition theory, a fundamental difference 
arises. Lindberg suggests that moving from authoritarian rule to a competitive electoral 
regime, tends to lead to further democratization, through the self-reinforcing power of 
elections. His theory therefore locates within the larger literature on democracy and the role 
of elections in promoting democratic growth. Lindberg as already alluded to in the literature 
above, talks of the self-reinforcing power of elections in the process of democratic growth. 
He further states that elections are a causal factor in democratization rather than , as often 
assumed, merely a reflection of democracy (Lindberg 2006:109).  
 
Other scholars that have agreed to this position are Seligson and Booth (1995:269) whose 
analysis specifies a causal association between elections and democratization. Their study 
involved six nations in Central America and their inductive inquiry points to the fact that 
elections promoted democracy in a couple of ways. They concluded that by opening up the 
political space for citizens, elections enabled people to mobilize and pursue their interests, 
petition government and local authorities, obtain and exchange information, and in effect 
had expanded civil liberties. These findings all corroborate Rustow’s (1970) hypothesis which 
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Similar findings have emerged from other scholars. For instance Howard and Roessler (2006) 
in their global study of electoral autocracies, found a strong support for what they label 
‘liberalizing effects of elections’. Their study reveals that despite the incumbent’s reliance on 
unfair practices, such as the use of coercive and unfair means to disadvantage the 
opposition and to ensure their own electoral success to stay in power, such elections 
occasionally result in a ‘liberalizing electoral outcome’ (LEO), which often leads to a new 
government that is considerably less authoritarian than its predecessor (Howard and 
Roessler 2006:2). Liberalizing electoral outcomes provide at least a chance for a new 
beginning in each of these countries. According to Howard and Roessler (2006:2) many of 
these countries in fact, liberalize to the point that they can eventually be considered as 
electoral democracies, rather than competitive authoritarian regimes.  
 
In recent contributions Bunce and Wolchik ( 2009:93-106) termed the transitions in Eastern 
Europe and former Soviet republics ‘electoral revolutions’, while Hadenius and Teorell 
(2007) in their global study of democratization, found that most successful transitions go 
‘the electoral route’ of successively more free and fair elections eventually bringing them to 
a democratic dispensation. Schedler’s (2002) study points to the causal effect of elections 
and democracy and resounds the fact that his study was the first to coin the label 
‘democratization by elections’.  Huntington (1991) moves beyond the mere causation effect 
of elections and states that elections are indicators of consolidation. According to 
Huntington (1991:174) election are not only the life of democracy, but are the death of 
dictatorship. Zambia has had a series of five uninterrupted election and going by the views of 
the scholars presented above these elections should have led to increased democraticness 
within the country. Elections according to Lindberg (2006:109) and others are a sufficient 
condition for democratic growth. 
 
Some researchers have sought to differ and argued that elections do not have a role in 
democratization. Theorists such as Herbst (2000:253) have asserted that elections have no 
role in democratization and are of no use as indicators of country’s process of 
democratization. Others such as Terry Karl (1995:72) have criticized the tendency to equate 
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that elections alone are not sufficient to make a democracy. Carothers (2002:8) concludes 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This Chapter will discus the methodology used in the overtime analysis of democratic quality 
in Zambia.  This is a longitudinal within country study which provides an in-depth overtime 
analysis of democratic quality in Zambia. A fourteen year time frame (1996-2010)8 is used for 
the purposes of this research, in order to capture the periods subsequent to Zambian’s 2nd, 
3rd, 4th and 5th elections. The fourteen year period is significant because it marks Zambia’s 
second election and onwards which was after the first election of 1991 which signified the 
return to multipartism.  
 
This Chapter as below is arranged into three sections 1. Measuring Democracy More 
Precisely,2. Measurement of Key Concepts,3. Data Collection and Research Limitations. The 
first section on Measuring Democracy More Precisely gives an overview of the some of 
weakness of using a single cross national data set such as Freedom House to conclude that a 
country has experienced democratic growth. In light of this, the section outlines some of the 
controls used in the methodology to circumvent these challenges. The Measurement of Key 
Concepts section outlines the sub-concepts that were used to measure democratic quality 
and how each sub-concept was measured. The section on Data Collection gives an overview 
of the data sources that were used, data analysis technique employed and presentation of 
data. Lastly a section on Research Limitations concludes this Chapter. 
  
3.1 Measuring Democracy More Precisely 
 
As earlier alluded to in Chapter One (refer to Section 1.2), the statistical evidence as shown 
by Freedom House suggests that there is a gradual, over time positive trend in political rights 
in Zambia (refer to Table 1 in Chapter One, Section 1.2). However this does not necessarily 
mean that Lindberg is correct in concluding that repeated elections actually promote 
democratic growth. This is because there are limitations that exist when using a single data 
                                                     
8
 Important Note; The end date for data collection as provided by this time frame was before the most recent 
election held on 20
th
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source such as Freedom House to make or support such conclusions. Firstly some cross 
national data methodologies like Freedom House are not transparent. Hadenius (2004) 
observes that Freedom House methodology, is not transparent and therefore assessment of 
the scales is difficult. Though both Freedom House and Transparency International have 
tried to make available what constitutes each of the scores, they do not give information on 
the weights attached to arrive at the composite score. In this thesis, the section on 
Measurement of key Concepts (Section 3.2) tries to avoid this pitfall of a non transparent 
methodology, by clearly outlining the sub-concepts that were used to measure democratic 
quality and how each sub-concept was measured. 
 
Another limitation of using a single data source is the discrepancy that arises between public 
opinion data and cross national scales. Joakim Ekman (2009) reveals positive citizens feelings 
about democracy from public opinion analysis in countries such as Tanzania, Russia and 
Venezuela but these countries tend to have negative cross national scores. Individuals judge 
the countries as democratic but ‘experts’ view them as not being fully democratic. In some 
instances state propaganda has been used to explain this but it still raises the question of 
which measure of democracy really matters. This study does not only rely on only public 
opinion data nor expert cross national data but analyses both measures. This is aimed at 
controlling for any discrepancies that may arise between public opinion data and expert 
ratings scales. 
 
Added to the limitations is that most cross national data like Freedom House lack a country 
specific approach, as it is informed by ‘experts’ that are sometimes not resident within the 
country. This observation was supported by Landman (2007) who argues that complex 
causal mechanisms can best be understood from a country specific approach. Measured 
scales from cross national data lacking a country specific approach are not able to capture 
contextual effects. Landman (2007) therefore advocates using analysts that are resident in 
countries to avoid data bias that is ‘common with most cross national data’.  
 
The above concerns have been amply addressed within the methodology. The researcher for 
this study has been resident in Zambia for the past 29 years thereby providing insight into 
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democratic growth in Zambia. As a result of this country specific approach, greater 
understanding was provided for complex causal mechanisms which may not have been 
present in Lindberg’s cross national data that was informed by ‘experts’. Also a wide range of 
data sources were used to allow for greater scope. The study used Freedom House data, 
Polity data, Heritage House's Index of Economic Freedom, the Bertelsman Index, World Bank 
Institute Governance Indicators and Afrobarometer data and working papers. In addition 
country reports from Media Institute of Southern Africa, Amnesty international, Human 
Rights Watch, United Nations Human Rights, World Bank, Legal Resource Foundation 
Zambia, Transparency International, Electoral Commission of Zambia publications together 
with books, journals and other publications. This approach supplemented for data that may 
be missing and is recommended by Hadenius (2004) among other scholars, when using data 
that may have missing aspects arising from a lack of contextual approach.  
 
Lastly there is still debate relating to the conceptualisation of democracy and whether the 
dichotomous approach9 or graded approach10 is most appropriate for measuring democratic 
growth. Przeworski (1991) among other scholars has supported the dichotomous approach. 
They argue that democracy should be measured in dichotomous rather than graded terms. 
Another variation to this approach is the trichotomous approach promoted by Epstein et al. 
These scholars argue that a trichotomous measurement should be used. This is the scale 
employed by Polity IV which measures democracy on a scale of autocracy, partial democracy 
(Anocracy) and full democracy. 
 
Collier and Levitsky (2002) have critiqued this methodological approach of differentiating 
between democracies and non democracies. They argue that the use of residual categories 
often tends to gloss over important differences among regime types. Regimes that are 
different in fundamental ways are grouped in the same category.  For instance, both 
Zimbabwe and Sudan in the 2009 Freedom House report are categorized as not free with the 
same political rights score of 7. A critical analysis of the two countries reveals that Sudan 
                                                     
9
 The dichotomous approach uses categories. Democracy measurement in this form tends to make use of 
categories such free and not-free or democratic versus autocratic. 
 
10 The graded approach assigns values that represent less or more of the measure of democracy i.e. a Freedom 
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carried out on going war crimes and genocide which were grave whereas in Zimbabwe 
violence was mainly reported around election time. The two crises alluded to are 
fundamentally different in nature but both countries belong to the same category. The 
graded approach has been supported by scholars such as Hadenius (2004) who argue that a 
continuous approach is better than a dichotomous one because democracy is not a yes or no 
question. Elkins (2000) also argues that to build a stable model of democracy the degree of 
the democracy matters 
 
The concern raised by scholars relating to the conceptualisation of democracy and lack of 
consensus on whether the dichotomous approach or graded approach is the most 
appropriate measure of democracy, raises the need to make a country specific enquiry to 
asses if indeed the existing measures of democracy on Zambia reflect actual democratic 
qualities within society. 
 
3.2 Measurement of Key Concepts  
 
A within country, over time analysis of Zambia was conducted to assess if Zambia is indeed 
becoming more democratic.  The larger concept in this enquiry was therefore democratic 
quality and the sub-concepts used to measure democratic quality are participation, 
competition, judicial autonomy, legislative autonomy, executive power, openness, and 
popular legitimacy of democracy. These concepts present a far broader coverage of the 
quality of Zambia's democracy than the political rights and civil liberties that Freedom House 
considers.  
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 Table 2: Measurement of Key Concepts  
Concept  Indicator  Data Source 
Participation 1. Has there been an increase in actual voter participation?  
2. Has there been any increased contact with elected officials?  
3. Has there been increased civil society participation such as attending community meetings?  
4. Are citizens free to form political and civic organisations, free of state interference and surveillance?  
5. What is the extent to which adult population show an interest in and follow politics in the news?  
Amnesty International Report, Legal Resource 
Centre Zambia, Bertelsmann Index Zambia, 
Newspaper articles, Afrobarometer data, 
Electoral Commission of Zambia and Journal 
articles/books 
Competition 1. How many candidates were fielded for elections overtime? 
2. How many parties contested elections overtime? 
3. What was the winner’s percentage of the total vote cast overtime?  
4. How many parliamentary seats were won by the opposition? 
5. Do laws provide equal campaigning opportunities?  
6. Do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving government?  
Bertelsmann Index Zambia, Afrobarometer data, 
Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of 
Democracy in Africa, Electoral Commission of 
Zambia and Journal articles/books 
Judicial Autonomy  
1. Is the judiciary allowed to function freely?  
2. Does the judiciary support democratic rights such as petitioning authorities and demonstrating?  
3. To what extent is the judiciary independent of government influence?  
4. Have the courts ever issued an important judgment against the government, or a senior government 
official?  
5. To what degree are citizens treated equally under the law.  
6. Are favoured members of groups spared from prosecution under the law?  
Bertelsmann Index Zambia, Newspaper articles 
and Journal articles/books 
 
Legislative Autonomy 1. Is the legislature the supreme political body, with a clear supremacy over other branches of government? 
2. Does an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority exist? 
3.  Do institutions provide citizens with the opportunity to successfully petition government to redress 
grievances?  
4. Are there sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for ensuring government accountability to the 
electorate in between elections? 
Polity data, Bertelsmann Index Zambia and 
Journal articles/books 
 
Executive Power 1. Does the Constitution of Zambia maintain, enhance or delimit executive powers in promoting democracy. Freedom House, Polity data, Bertelsmann Index 
Zambia and Journal articles/books 
Openness 1. Is the functioning of government open and transparent, with sufficient public access to information? 
2.  Are all citizens allowed access to public offices and information?  
3. Do media bodies (both private and public) operate freely? 
4.  To what extent is freedom of expression of the media accommodated?  
5. How pervasive is corruption? 
Media Institute of Southern Africa, Freedom 
House, Afrobarometer data, Amnesty 
International Report, Bertelsmann Index Zambia, 
Transparency International, Newspaper articles, 
Journal articles/books and Heritage House's 
Index 
Popular Legitimacy of Democracy 1. Do people prefer democracy and reject authoritarian rule? 
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3.2.1 Participation  
 
The feature of participation in democracies is based on the notion of citizen’s political 
equality. Individuals, who wish, should be able to form a political party and contest in 
elections on the same conditions as everyone else (Lindberg 2006:23). Added to the above 
definition of participation are civil liberties and civic engagement. Civil liberties are rights 
protected by institutions that allow the individual to engage in the democratic process. Civic 
engagement can include among other things, citizenship involvement in community 
processes such as meetings and engaging elected leader.  
 
Therefore voter turn-out is used as an indicator to measure the sub-concept of participation, 
as it points to the level of actual participation, under the assumption that everyone would 
vote if they had the same opportunity. The key question is thus, has there been an increase 
in actual voter participation? Other indicators used to measure participation include, contact 
with elected officials and attending community meetings. These are important elements of 
civic engagement which constitute an integral part of any definition of participation. Thus 
the key questions asked are; has there been any increased contact with elected officials? 
And has there been increased civil society participation such as attending community 
meetings?  
 
In addition the study also used indicators relating to political participation, which assessed 
the extent to which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news. 
Lastly, when measuring the sub-concept of participation, the extent to which citizens are 
guaranteed rights and freedom to participate and also the degree to which these are upheld 
was considered. This is because it was viewed that a standalone enquiry on levels of citizen 
participation, may not provide accurate information into the underlying factors influencing 
their participation or lack of thereof. The key question of whether citizens are free to form 
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3.2.2 Competition  
 
Competition is defined ‘as the struggle for the highest executive or legislative office 
channelled through a specific kind of electoral processes, which are constituted by a 
particular set of rules governing candidate, party, and voter eligibility criteria, political rights 
of speech, association and information, electoral management bodies, the electoral system, 
district boundaries, campaign contributions, voting requirements and rules for complaints 
and abjuration’ Lindberg (2006:23).  
 
In order to measure this sub-concept of democratic quality, indicators such as the number of 
parties contesting elections overtime and winners share of votes in presidential elections 
were used. As such, the following key questions were asked; how many parties contested 
elections and what was the winner’s percentage of the total vote cast overtime? 
Furthermore indicators of competition relating to the largest party’s share of seats in the 
legislature and how many parliamentary seats were won by the opposition were explored. 
These necessitated questions like what was the largest party’s share of seats in the 
legislative elections and how many parliamentary seats were won by the opposition? 
Indicators relating to the second party’s share of votes and the occurrence of alternations in 
power were further analysed. According to Lindberg alternation of power is the ultimate 
indicator of competitiveness. If competitive electoral regimes are really competitive it is 
likely at some point that alternations in power will occur.  Guided by this the following 
questions were asked: do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving 
government, do laws provide equal campaigning opportunities and what is the threshold 
required for presidency? 
 
3.2.3 Judicial Autonomy 
 
Judicial Autonomy relates to the independence of the Judiciary and its ability to be able to 
exercise power over other arms of government when need be. An autonomous Judiciary as 
highlighted needs to be independent of government influence and is expected to support 
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explored and necessitated the following question; does the judiciary support democratic 
rights such as petitioning authorities and demonstrating? In addition in practice courts 
should be allowed to function freely and ought to issue important judgments against the 
government, or senior government officials if need arises. The later constitutes an important 
indicator for judicial autonomy. This is a view supported by Julio Rios-Figueroa (2006:12) 
who contends that most scholarly work [Helmke (2002), Ramseyer and Rasmunsen (2003) 
and Laryczower et al 2002] involving country case studies use ‘decisions against the 
government as a proxy for judicial independence’. Therefore the following questions were 
asked; have the courts ever issued an important judgment against the government, or a 
senior government official and to what extent is the judiciary independent of government 
influence and is the judiciary allowed to function freely? Over and above, the analysis of the 
sub concept of judicial autonomy also included an enquiry as to the extent citizens are 
treated equally under the law and whether members of favoured groups are spared from 
prosecution under the law.  
 
3.2.4 Legislative Autonomy 
 
Legislative autonomy like judicial independence beckons the need for a legislature with a 
clear supremacy over other branches of government. As an institution the Legislature should 
provide an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority 
and a mechanism for ensuring government accountability to the electorate in between 
elections. Citizens should therefore have the opportunity to successfully petition 
government to redress grievances. Guided by the above indicators of Legislative autonomy 
the following questions were asked;  is the legislature the supreme political body, with a 
clear supremacy over other branches of government, does an effective system of checks and 
balances on the exercise of government authority exist and do institutions provide citizens 
with the opportunity to successfully petition government to redress grievances? Lastly are 
there sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for ensuring government accountability 
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3.2.5 Executive Power 
 
Under this sub-concept the study examines the powers of the Executive. The powers of the 
Executive are provided for by the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia. Therefore the 
study examines the various watersheds in the Constitutional making process in Zambia and 
the effect these have had on maintaining, enhancing or delimiting Executive powers. Does 
the Constitution of Zambia maintain, enhance or delimit executive powers in promoting 
democracy. 
 
3.2.6 Openness  
 
The sub-concept of openness examines whether the functioning of government is 
transparent. Indicators of openness would be the extent to which the public are allowed 
access to information. In addition to this is the question of whether private and public media 
bodies operate freely. Paramount to the media operating freely is the grantee of freedom of 
expression of these bodies. Transparency relates to an analysis that examines if there is 
honest and prudent use of public resources by those entrusted with the responsibility. 
Central to this is the extent to which corruption is pervasive. Therefore the enquiry under 
the concept of openness allowed for the following key questions; firstly is the functioning of 
government open and transparent, with sufficient public access to information, second are 
all citizens allowed access to public offices and information? Third do media bodies (both 
private and public) operate freely, fourth to what extent is freedom of expression of the 
media accommodated? And last how pervasive is corruption? 
 
3.2.7 Popular Legitimacy of Democracy 
 
Critical to any assessment of democracy are the citizens’ evaluations and experiences. This is 
because this provides essential ‘insider or ground-up’ assessments of democracy which may 
be absent from macro-level data or expert evaluations (Logan & Mattes 2010:5). The study 
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The two main indicators that were considered under this sub concept were whether people 
support democracy and rejection authoritarian alternatives. This beckoned two key 
questions namely; do people prefer democracy and reject authoritarian rule and what 
percentage of the public demonstrates confidence in government/Democracy?  
 
3.3 Data Collection 
 
The study used secondary sources of data to collect evidence on each sub-concept and its 
indicators in order to assess democratic quality in Zambia. Information relating to each 
indicator was derived from country data such as public opinion data, country reports, books, 
journals and other publications. The public opinion data and country data included Freedom 
House, Polity, Heritage House's Index of Economic Freedom, the Bertelsman Index, World 
Bank Institute Governance Indicators and Afrobarometer. Other country reports from Media 
Institute of Southern Africa, Amnesty international, Human Rights Watch, United Nations 
Human Rights, World Bank, Legal Resource Foundation Zambia, and Transparency 
International were also used. Data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia and Electoral 
Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) was used with together with 
books, journals and other publications 
 
For purposes of data analysis, for the qualitative data from country reports, books and 
journals on Zambia content analysis was applied.  This involved systematically identifying 
information relating to each of the indicators under the various sub-concepts being 
assessed.  The qualitative data for each sub-concept is presented in the form of a discussion 
per indicator covering the fourteen year time frame (1996-2010). At the end of this 
discussion an overtime in-depth analysis is provided in narrative for each sub-concept. The 
quantitative data from country data and public opinion data was analysed using descriptive 
statistics (graphs and tables). Overtime descriptive statistics (graphs and tables) were 
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3.4 Research Limitations  
 
One of the limitations the study faced was missing data from some of the data sources. For 
instance the Afrobarometer country data is only available from 1999 yet the study’s 
intention is to provide an overview from 1996. Added to this in a few instances some of the 
variables from the Afrobarometer data do not consistently have data for all the years.  The 
study attempted to control for aspects of missing data from one data source by using a 
multitude of data sources. Also, indirectly case studies can make an important contribution 
to the establishment of general propositions and thus to theory building .Though the study 
provides an in-depth analysis of democratic growth specific to Zambia, which is not present 
in Lindberg’s study. The study does not constitute the basis for a ‘valid generalization’ nor 
the ground for disproving Lindberg’s theory (Johson & Joslyn: 1995). This study will simply 
provide a basis for further inquiry into Lindberg’s theory. This can take the form of larger 
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CHAPTER 4: DISSCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter provides an overtime in-depth analysis of democratic growth in Zambia. The 
discussion and analysis covers seven dimensions of democratic quality participation, 
competition, judicial autonomy, legislative autonomy, executive power, openness, and 
popular legitimacy of democracy. A discussion is provided for each sub-concept broken 
down per indicator covering the fourteen year time frame (1996-2010). For some of the sub-
concepts the discussion of the indicators is assisted by descriptive statistics in the form of 
graphs and tables. Furthermore at the end of the discussion of each indicator an overview is 
provided on whether there has been process or regress. Added to this is a concluding 
overtime in-depth analysis for each concept.  
 
4.1 Participation  
  
The idea of an informed citizenry engaging in the democratic process is central to the 
realisation of a democratic state. Citizen’s participation in the democratic process is 
therefore important to the advancement of democracy in nations like Zambia. This section 
firstly assesses the extent to which citizens are guaranteed rights and freedom to participate 
and also the degree to which these are upheld. This is essential because a standalone 
enquiry on levels of citizen participation may not provide accurate information into the 
underlying factors influencing their participation or lack of thereof. Participation is based on 
an opportunity structure which is provided by the political institutions (Logan and Mattes 
2010:10). An in-depth assessment of the freedom of assembly and freedom of association 
was conducted and is provided below. Secondly an assessment of citizens’ levels of civic 
participation and political participation is provided. The analysis of participation covers four 
thematic areas namely freedom of association, freedom of assembly, civic participation and 
political participation.  
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Freedom of association as a civil liberty is guaranteed by the free formulation of civil society. 
In a democratic society the right to form or join civic organisations including trade unions 
and professional organisations must be guaranteed. Since 1991, there has been a rapid 
growth in the number of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Zambia within the area of 
democracy, good governance, decentralisation and poverty eradication. Their mandates 
range from monitoring government commitments to spend money on poverty reduction to 
fostering participation of communities in the development process.  
 
Zambian CSOs are regarded as credible alternatives to government when it comes to service 
delivery, in the form of community empowerment initiatives. But the relationship is often 
strained between government and those CSOs involved in advocacy, who point out 
government weaknesses and are often mistakenly regarded as political bodies. Both foreign 
and local CSOs that support local advocacy work have to tread carefully when openly 
criticising government’s role. Added to this, interaction between government and civil 
society is weak, muddled by undercurrent of mutual mistrust and suspicion. As such the 
government has made several attempts to regulate CSOs and has finally managed to do so.  
 
In 1998, 2000 and 2007 the government attempted to pass a Non Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) Law but they were met with strong opposition from international, 
regional and local development players.  In 2009, parliament11 finally passed the NGO Act of 
2009, which was designed to restrict the work of NGOs in Zambia through tighter 
regulations. The passing of this law is a clear indication of the state’s lamentable failure to 
uphold its obligations to protect human rights, especially the freedom of association, 
expression and assembly provided under international human rights instruments, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, and Zambia’s Constitution, which recognises that 
citizens must always have the capacity to join associations without state interference 
(Amnesty International Report 2009).  
 
                                                     
11
 One might argue that parliament is a composition of the opposition and ruling party but the irony of the 
situation is that parliament is controlled by the ruling party by virtue of its majority as will be discussed in 
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The new mandatory registration of civil society organisations restricts the right of NGOs who 
fail to register to exist and carry out collective activities. Requiring a group of people that has 
come together for a common purpose to register with the government first, as the new law 
does, is contrary to the notion of free association. The report by Amnesty International 
states that freedom of association cannot be ‘dependent on registration or legal personality, 
and it should not be a right granted by the government to its citizens’. Zambia’s new NGO 
Act not only regulates the formulation of CSOs but also gives discretionary powers to the 
new government-controlled NGO Board to determine both the sector and the geographical 
area where organisations can work. The new law further requires re-registration of NGOs 
every five years. These efforts go beyond regulation as they are aimed at granting the state 
influence and control. CSOs provide a mechanism of vertical accountability and these efforts 
are clearly meant to frustrate any attempts in this direction. In 2010 Freedom House civil 
liberties rankings in Zambia declined from 3 to 4 (refer to Table 1 above) due to these 
restrictions on nongovernmental organizations.  
 
Judging by the forgoing the overall tend shows that there has been a regress in terms of 
freedom of association. This is because despite domestic, regional and international 
objection the government has still proceeded and imposed tighter regulation by tampering 
with the law that provides for freedom of association. This as already mentioned is a direct 
infringement of human rights as provided for by international human rights instruments and 
in conflict with democratic values. 
 
4.1.2 Freedom of assembly  
 
Freedom of assembly as a civil liberty must be guaranteed in a democratic society. Freedom 
of assembly includes the right to demonstrate and to have open public discussions. This 
freedom if allowed to prevail, complements the work of civil society and opposition political 
parties in a democratic society, as it serves as a forum to express views that are divergent 
from the state and as such is a measure of state tolerance. In Zambia this freedom has been 
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(POA). The Public Order Act12 was part of the legislation inherited from colonial rule which 
served and continues to serve the purpose of prohibiting public meetings and protests not 
sanctioned by the police. The Act has been left on the statute books despite clear rulings by 
the judiciary to the effect that it has no place in a democratic society13 (Legal Resource 
Centre). 
 
Under the POA, the police must be notified of all demonstrations seven days in advance; 
while the law does not require demonstrators to acquire a permit, the police have 
frequently broken up "illegal" protests because the organizers lacked a permit. The police 
frequently deny rally permits to opposition and citizens' groups, and forcibly break up 
demonstrations (Bertelsmann Index Zambia14). The POA has been used by the state to 
restrict the freedom of assembly of political opponents or those critical to it thereby creating 
unfair competition. In December 2004 and January 2005, civic groups and opposition 
politicians held demonstrations calling for a Constituent Assembly and the enactment of a 
new constitution before the 2006 elections; 68 protestors-including members of the United 
Party for National Development (UPND) and some journalists-were briefly detained in 
December for participating in an "illegal" protest.  
 
In November 2005, the Oasis Forum a coalition of civil society and church group’s attempts 
to coordinate protests of Zambians, to push for a Constituent Assembly had most of their 
permits denied (Amnesty international Report 2007). Police further prevented Q-FM, a 
private radio station, from covering live a demonstration outside Parliament organized by 
the OASIS forum and the Collaborative Group on the constitution. Though the conveners of 
the demonstration had informed the police in advance, police claimed that the permit did 
not include media coverage. In November 2006, the government moved to restrict the 
activities of Michael Sata and his Patriotic Front party. On 22 November 2006, President 
Mwanawasa instructed the police not to grant Michael Sata permission to hold post-election 
rallies, but the Solicitor-General, Sunday Nkonde, overruled the ban. In response, the 
                                                     
12
 The Public Order Act requires that police be notified 14 days before any public gathering can take place. The 
police have decided to misinterpret notification and instead grant or deny permits. Police usually sight shortage 
of manpower as a reason for denying permits. 
13 The Supreme Court found that section 5(4) of the Act contravened Articles 96 (Protection of freedom of 
expression) and 97 (Protection of freedom of assembly and association) of the Constitution. 
14
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President called on the Solicitor-General to resign (Amnesty International Report 2007).In 
2010 the police arrested two members of parliament from the opposition Patriotic Front for 
taking part in demonstration against the newly proposed constitution. Furthermore 
opposition political rallies are frequently interrupted by ruling party cadres, in the full view 
of police who are unable to do anything for fear of losing their jobs. The Solwezi Central by 
elections held in September 2010 was one such incident where the opposition United Party 
for National Development (UPND) leader was attacked in the presence of the Inspector 
General of police and some junior police officers. During this incident perpetrators were not 
brought to book but the police opted to scamper for safety (The Post Newspaper15).  
 
The overall trend reveals that it is difficult to assembly freely in Zambia and more so if the 
cause motivating the gathering is not supported by the government. The law is again being 
used to deny citizens their freedom of assembly.  The grantee of Freedom of Assembly 
remains a selective process which is determined by the police aided by colonial legislation. 
There has not been any progress with regard to freedom of assembly as legislation is yet to 
be favourably changed. As observed by the Supreme Court justices the Public Order Act ‘has 
no place in a democratic society’.  
 
4.1.3 Civic Participation 
 
Civic participation is an integral part of democracy as it allows for citizens to interact with 
political institutions. Civic engagement is essential in refining political institutions and 
promoting a more transparent political regime. Also related to this is the realisation of the 
ideal democrat who is part and parcel of the democratic process. The in-depth analysis 
explored attitudinal data to assess the levels of participation among Zambian citizens. The 
assessment involved reviewing behaviour trends on key indicators of participation namely; 
contacting elected officials and attending community meetings. 
 
Firstly the study assessed using Afrobarometer data if there was increased contact with 
elected officials. Contact of an elected official would demonstrate ability to participate 
                                                     
15
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within one’s community and engage in the political system. The graph below shows the 
frequency distribution for contact with Member of Parliament for the years 1999, 2005 and 
2009. 
 
Figure 1: Contacted Member of Parliament 
 
 
* Source: Afrobarometer data 
 
Figure 1 above shows that overtime, the majority (82-92 percent) of Zambian citizens never 
contacted elected officials or political leaders for help to solve problems or to give them 
their views. This could indicat  lack of information on how to contact elected officials. On 
the other hand this could indicate a lack of interest due to the unresponsive nature of these 
elected officials. Contact with elected members of parliament has remained low. In 1999 
only about 9% of total respondents reported as having contacted a member of parliament 
compared to 18% in 2003, 10% in 2005 and about 14% in 2009. By and large the percentages 
still remain small. 
 
Secondly the study assessed if there had been increased civil society participation such as 
attending community meetings. Again attending a community meeting is an indicator of 
someone’s willingness to participate in the democratic process. The graph below shows the 
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Figure 2: Attend Community Meeting  
 
 
*Source: Afrobarometer data 
 
It is evident from Figure 2 that over 55% of the respondents attended community meetings 
for the respective years under inquiry (1999, 2003, 2005, and 2009). What is interesting to 
note is that community participation in meetings was slowly declining from 1999 to 2005 
until recently (2009). Despite the sharp climb in 2009 to about 62% community participation 
is still not as pronounced as 1999 where about 72% of the respondents reported as having 
participated in community meetings. 
 
From the two indicators of civic participation assessed, the data on contacting elected 
officials shows that things have remained the same. There has not been progress. Overtime, 
the majority (82-92 percent) of Zambian citizens never contacted elected officials. With 
regard to the indicators of attending community meetings there has been an overtime 
regress. Community participation in meetings was slowly declining from 1999 to 2005 until 
recently (2009). Despite the sharp climb in 2009 to about 62% community participation is 
still not as pronounced as 1999 where about 72% of the respondents reported as having 
participated in community meetings. Overall there has been a minor regress in terms of civic 
participation as community participation has declined and is yet to be restored to its 
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regarding freedom of assembly and freedom of association. Added to this the majority of 
Zambians have consistently not contacted elected officials overtime.  
 
4.1.4 Political Participation  
 
Political participation involves going beyond merely being knowledgeable about the political 
system to acting within the provided political space. It allows individuals to be part of the 
democratic process and may involve actions such as participating in elections. Beyond this it 
allows individuals to decide who presides over their affairs.  The analysis on political 
participation examines attitudinal data on discussion of political matters with friends and 
family. Furthermore political participation in elections was explored using voting figures in 
relation to voter turn-out. More specifically the analysis involved a triangular assessment of 
eligible voters, registered voters and actual voter turn-out. 
 
Interest in politics in Zambia was explored as part of the inquiry on political participation. 
The graph below presents the frequency distribution of the extent to which Zambians 
discuss political matters with friends and family. 
 
Figure 3: Discuss political matters with friends and family 
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Generally the data shows that most recently (2009) the number of people discussing politics 
has increased. In 2003 the highest number of respondents (about 40%) reported to having 
discussed politics. There was a political landmark in 2001 that may explain the increased 
interest in discussing politics around this period. Chiluba’s attempt to stand for a third term 
may have set in motion greater interest in political matters even for those who would 
otherwise be disinterested. However this declined and only rose in 2009. Overall, the data 
reveals fluctuations with regard to interest in discussing politics.  
 
Part of the political participation enquiry was centred on citizen’s involvement in elections. 
Involvement in elections is an essential indicator of participation in political process. Voter 
turn-out is used to indicate the level of actual participation. The table below shows 
participation figures for presidential elections from 1991 to 2008. 
 





















2008 11,669,534 5,241,627 3,944,135 1,791,806 45.43% 34.18% 
2006 11,502,010 5,002,483 3,941,229 2,789,114 70.77% 55.75% 
2001 9,582,418 _______ 2,604,761 1,766,356 67.81% _____ 
1996 9,712,000 4,467,520 2,267,382 1,258,805 55.52% 28.18% 
1991 8,412,000 3,869,520 2,981,895 1,325,155 44.44% 34.25% 
*Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia 
*PPRV stands for Proportion of Population of Registered Voters 
*PPVA stands for Proportion of Population of Voting Age 
 
The voting turnout as a proportion of population of registered voters has slowly been 
increasing from 1996 to 2006 (55.2%-70.77%).A slump was recorded in 2008 to 45.43%. This 
could be due to the fact that the by elections following the death of Mwanawasa was 
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age increased from 28.18% in 1996 to 55.75% in 2006 but also recorded a slump in 2008 
possibly for the reasons illustrated above.  
 
From the three indicators analysed on political participation namely; discussion of political 
matters with friends and family and figures in relation to voter turn-out the following can be 
concluded; Overall, the data reveals fluctuations with regard to interest in discussing politics 
with the highest number of respondents (about 40%) in 2003 reported to having discussed 
politics. Importantly voting turnout as a proportion of population of registered voters has 
slowly been increasing from 1996 to 2006 (55.2%-70.77%) though a slump was recorded in 
2008 to 45.43%. Turnout as proportion of population of voting age, increased from 28.18% 
in 1996 to 55.75% in 2006 but also recorded a slump in 2008.  This as explained could be due 
to the fact that the by elections following the death of Mwanawasa as unexpected leaving 
most voters unprepared. Political participation can therefore be said to be improving where 
there are no restrictions such as on voting, where improvements have been recorded. This 
said the effect towards improving democracy would be greater if there were no restrictions.  
 
4.1.5 Overtime Analysis of Participation  
 
One of the drivers of citizen participation is civil society organisations. Instead of promoting 
their existence the government has worked towards weakening CSOs in Zambia. CSOs that 
engage in advocacy work have unfortunately been viewed as a threat to the state. It is 
therefore not surprising that the government has instigated these measures. This is 
unfortunate as CSOs in Zambia were hailed as the driving factor in overcoming the one party 
state and should therefore have a role to play in consolidating democracy in Zambia. This 
could also explain the current leaders’ agitation towards CSOs. Zambia has witnessed the 
same individuals that held public office in the one party state resurface within the corridors 
of power. An example is the current president Rupiah Banda an old party stalwart of the 
United National Independence Party (UNIP) now holding the highest office in the land under 
the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). This in some way echoes Bratton’s 
(1997:64) observation that Africa was returning to an institutional legacy of the ‘big man’ 
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enhance citizen participation or democracy in Zambia. Civil society regulation of this nature 
has no place in a democracy. 
 
Citizen participation in Zambia is further hindered as freedom of assembly is restricted. 
Freedom of assembly is controlled by state organs through repugnant colonial laws such as 
the Public Order Act. This Act has remained in the statutes despite a Supreme Court ruling 
that declared that it had no place in a democratic society (Legal Resource Centre). Political 
parties and individuals are harassed under the disguise of the law. Permits are rarely given 
for public marches or demonstration with a motive to oppose the government. Guaranteed 
rights and freedom of citizens to participate will surely enhance democracy in Zambia. This 
will also be important in determining if the current dose of democracy will continue to be 
preferred by citizens. 
 
The assessment of citizen’s level of civic participation shows the majority (85-90 percent) of 
Zambian citizens never contacted elected officials. This could indicate lack of information on 
how to contact elected officials or a lack of interest due to the unresponsive nature these 
elected officials. Elected leaders are the representatives of the people. Constant contact 
with these leaders could refine their decision making and allow them to preside over 
matters in the interest of those they rule. With regards to community meetings over 55% of 
the respondents attended community meetings for the respective years under inquiry (1999, 
2003, 2005, and 2009). What is interesting to note is that community participation in 
meetings was slowly declining from 1999 until recently (2009). Despite the sharp climb in 
2009 to about 62% community participation is still not as pronounced as in 1999 where 
about 72% of the respondents reported as having participated in community meetings 
(Afrobarometer). Community engagement is a key element to enhancing civic and general 
participation in the democratic process and should therefore be encouraged. 
 
There are fluctuations in the level of interest in politics by Zambians. This may be influenced 
by agenda setting within the political landscape. Periods with political landmarks show 
greater interest than other periods. For instance in 2003 the highest number of respondents 
(about 40%) reported having discussed politics (Afrobarometer). This Afrobarometer survey 
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population of registered voters has slowly been increasing from 1996 to 2006 (55.2%-
70.77%). A slump was recorded in 2008 to 45.43% which could be due to the fact that the by 
elections following the death of Mwanawasa were unexpected leaving most voters 
unprepared.  Turnout as proportion of population of voting age increased from 28.18% in 
1996 to 55.75% in 2006 but also recorded a slump in 2008 possibly for the reasons 
illustrated above (Electoral Commission of Zambia). This interest in politics could be 
attributed to political historic events such as, the barring of Kenneth Kaunda from contesting 
elections in 1996 and Fredrick Chiluba’s failed third term bid of 2000 among others. Another 
factor that can explain this is the expectation associated with a growing democracy that has 




A competitive political environment is one that presents opposition parties a realistic 
prospect of achieving government. This has been expressed more shrewdly by Diamond and 
Morlino (2005) who suggest that the ultimate measure of competition is the ease with which 
incumbents can actually be defeated. This entails a level playing field in which all political 
players have equal footing, without undue influence in terms of access to state funds and 
platforms (media among others).Beyond that, a competitive political environment entails 
tolerance towards diverging views. In the assessment of the sub-concept of Competition the 
indicator of electoral competition was considered. 
 
4.2.1 Electoral Competition 
 
Electoral competition involving regular, free and fair elections among political parties is 
essential to any given democracy. In fact based on Robert Dahl (1971) conception of a 
democracy, elections are a minimal indicator of democracy.  Added to this, Lindberg 
(2006:23) argues that the occurrence of alternations in power is the ultimate indicator of 
competitiveness. Therefore elections alone are not sufficient indicators of competitiveness. 
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are really competitive it is likely at some point that alternations in power will occur (ibid 
2006:23).  
 
The political landscape in Zambia makes it difficult to have an alternation in power. The 
country from the second republic16 has been presided over by a single party. The MMD has 
presided over the affairs of the country from 1991 to date (2011) representing 20 years of 
rule. This reaffirms Cowen and Laakso (2002: 23) observation which suggested that ruling 
party domination, coupled with voter apathy had contributed to the stagnation of 
transitions. Single party domination has had a tendency of creating patronage as individuals 
in power do anything to continue to stay in power for continued benefits. Luckily there has 
not been a complete reversal in regime (a return to a single party state) but democratically 
there have not been any improvements.  
 
An alternation in power based on competition is difficult in Zambia as the political playing 
field has not been level and is littered with a history of electoral irregularities. Bertelsmann 
Index Country Report on Zambia of 2010 outlines that there are some constraints on the 
extent to which elections can be considered free and fair in Zambia. An overview of elections 
in Zambia reveals that all the elections from 1996 to 2008 have been marred with 
irregularities. The second election in 1996 was flawed with disputes and controversy. The 
then president Fredrick Chiluba barred his leading opponent from contesting the 1996 
election and following this, a number of parties boycotted the elections due to disagreement 
over electoral rules and processes. The parties that contested the 1996 elections later 
challenged the election results in the Zambian courts. There was a general feeling though 
that despite these manipulations Chiluba was still favoured to win the elections due to the 
economic reforms he had initiated.  
 
While there was no boycott of the 2001 general elections, the uncertainty of the rules and 
regulations affected the quality of the 2001 electoral process. This was demonstrated by the 
fact that, ‘International observers and the domestic opposition alike heavily criticised the 
                                                     
16
 Zambia is in its fourth republic with the first having been presided over by Kenneth Kaunda, second Fredrick 
Chiluba, third levy Mwanwasa and fourth Rupiah Banda. Aside from the first republic, that was presided over 
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administration of the presidential and parliamentary elections’ (Bertelsmann Index Country 
Report Zambia: 2010). The losing opposition parties’ alleged electoral malpractice and three 
of the unsuccessful presidential candidates brought lawsuits against the state. The electoral 
victory of Levy Mwanawasa was challenged by three opposition parties (United Party for 
National Development, Heritage Party and Forum for Democracy and Development) in the 
Supreme Court and 37 parliamentary elections were petitioned in the High Courts.  
 
The elections of 2006 were different to the preceding two. Losing candidate Michael Chilufya 
Sata challenged Mwanawasa’s election victory which ushered him into his second term of 
office. Though the EU observer mission described the elections to be ‘generally peaceful and 
well managed’, the government used state resources to campaign. The Electoral Commission 
proved ineffective in supervising the poll. There were several cases of delays in opening 
polling stations, while the collation, counting and transmission of results was not only 
delayed but also full of inaccuracies, resulting in more than 50 electoral petitions 
(Bertelsmann Index Country Report Zambia: 2010). Sata called upon the international 
community to intervene but refused to petition owing to what he termed as lack of 
confidence in the courts of law17. This was not surprising as an earlier petition of 2001 which 
was lodged in December 2001, was only turned down in February 2005 by the Supreme 
Court which throw out the petition to nullify the presidential elections.  
 
The recent by-election of 2008 had similar outcomes, leading to a petition by the Patriotic 
Front in the Supreme Court, challenging the election of Rupiah Bwezani Banda following the 
by-election held after the death of Levy Mwanawasa. Sata filed a legal challenge calling for a 
recount, but his request was rejected by the Supreme Court in March 2009. Lindberg states 
that even if elections are disputed they should improve with time and lead to more 
democraticness. Despite this assertion it appears that the quality of elections is not 
improving and people are losing faith in the electoral process. The Figure (Figure 12) below 
shows respondents evaluations of elections. Respondents were asked on the whole, how 
they would rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held. 
 
Figure 4: Evaluations of Elections  
                                                     
17

















* Source: Afrobarometer data 
 
The Figure above shows that 56% to 48% of respondents in recent times (2005 and 2009) 
feel that elections are not free and fair. This represents almost half of the respondents 
during this period. This confirms the general feeling of the political parties that have 
petitioned the government and is further an indication that these parties have simply not 
been bad losers. 
 
After reviewing data on the quality of elections and prospects for alternation in power, it can 
be seen that there has not been any progress. As discussed the quality of elections has not 
improved overtime and an alternation in power is difficult in Zambia as the playing field has 
not been levelled.  
 
As part of the electoral competiveness assessment the study also explored how many 
presidential candidates contested elections overtime from various political parties. Table 15 
below illustrates this enquiry. 
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* Sources: Electoral Commission of Zambia, http://www.elections.org.zm/results/seatswonout.php & Electoral Institute for 
the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zam4.htm 
*a UNIP boycotted the election in 1996 when Kaunda was barred from contesting.*b The patriotic front contested the 2001 
elections but only managed to get 3.4% of the total vote.*c In 2006 UPND formed a coalition called United Democratic 
Alliance (UDA) with FDD and ZDC. 
*The period of interest is from the second election (1996-2008). There are always a number of political parties contesting 
any given election in Zambia. The parties presented in the table above are those that got at least 10% of the total vote as 
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There are always a number of political parties contesting any given election in Zambia. This 
may appear to be a good indicator of a competitive democracy but the reality is that this 
leads to vote splitting and minority presidents. Zambia uses the first past the post system, 
which has in the past permitted a wining candidate to assume office with only 28.7% (2001). 
The opposition has argued that the rules be changed because the total opposition votes 
from 2001 elections onwards have been more than the ruling party. The opposition have 
been advocating that the winning candidate should have 51% of the total votes cast, and in 
the event that this is not achieved re-run of the top two should be conducted. The ruling 
party has been opposed to this because they clearly do not have majority support. Zambia 
continues to have minority Presidents and the government remains opposed to changing the 
system as the status quo works in their favour. As such there has not been any progress. 
 
Opposition political parties also remain divided and their voting constituents are split on 
lines of ethnicity. It has therefore been alleged that some political parties in areas that are 
dominated by the opposition are sponsored by the ruling party to split votes and allow 
continued dominance of the ruling party. In terms of the parliamentary elections from 2001 
the opposition has continued to hold the majority of seats as shown in Table 5 below. The 
majority of seats were won by the opposition but this has had no bearing in the long run due 
to constant Floor crossing. The MMD continued to have a hold on power as far as the 
legislature is concerned.  
 
Table 5: Vote and seat distribution 1996 – 2008 
 
 1996 2001 2006 
 Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
MMD 60.88 87.33 28.02 46.0  _____ 50.00 
Second Party *a 13.79 1.33 23.77 32.7 _____ 28.67 
Third Party *b 9.98 6.67 15.58 8.0 _____ 17.33 
 
*Sources: Electoral Commission of Zambia, http://www.elections.org.zm/results/seatswonout.php & Electoral 
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*There are a total of 150 seats in the Zambian Parliament. 
*a In 1996-ZDC, 2001-UPND, 2006-PF 
*b In 1996-Independents, 2001-FDD, 2006-UDA 
 
Electoral laws also leave much to be desired as they do not provide for equal campaigning 
opportunities. The state has repeatedly used public resources when running for election 
which are not available to the opposition. Government vehicles, air craft and other logistics 
have been used to carry out campaigns. Besides this there are also legislative barriers to 
political competition aside from the freedom of assembly explained in Chapter 4 Section 
4.1.2. Recent changes to the Electoral Act No 12 of 2006, empowers the president and not 
the electoral commission to set the election date. This gives undue advantage to the ruling 
party.  
 
As emphasised with the other indicators reviewed on Electoral Competition there has not 
been any progress. Despite the majority of seats being won by the opposition in Parliament 
there has been no bearing in the long run due to constant Floor crossing. The state uses 
public resources and as such has an undue advantage over other political parties. The 
Electoral Act and other laws (Public Order Act) present legislative barriers to political 
competition as the manner in which they are applied disadvantages opposition political 
parties’. 
 
4.2.2 Overtime Analysis of Competition  
 
If we go by Diamond and Morlino (2005) ultimate measure of competition which is the ease 
with which incumbents can actually be defeated then we can conclude that the facet of 
competition will remain difficult as far as Zambia is concerned. There has not been any 
alternation in power from the first democratic elections of 1991. Coupled with this the 
quality of elections has not improved overtime and an alternation in power is difficult as the 
playing field has not been levelled. This is reinforced by peoples’ evaluations of elections 
which reveal that almost half of the respondents in the Afrobarometer’s recent studies 
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Opposition political parties also remain divided and their voting constituents are split on the 
lines of ethnicity. Since the opposition is divided and Zambia uses the first past the post 
system, the president can assume office with as little as 28.7% of the vote. Zambia continues 
to have minority Presidents and the government remains opposed to changing the system as 
the status quo works in their favour. Electoral laws are fraudulent and do not provide for 
equal campaigning opportunities. The state has repeatedly used public resources when 
running for election which are not available to the opposition. Besides this there are also 
legislative barriers to political completion aside from the freedom of assembly explained in 
chapter 4. Recent changes to the Electoral Act No 12 of 2006, empowers the president and 
not the electoral commission to set the election date. This gives undue advantage to the 
ruling party.  
 
4.3 Judicial Autonomy  
 
4.3.1 Judiciary  
 
The Judiciary can only be effective if it is allowed to function freely. This means that it should 
support democratic rights even if these are in conflict with those in authority. A well 
functioning judiciary enhances ‘horizontal accountability18’ and is supposed to be 
independent of government influence. The judiciary should treat citizens equally under the 
law, with no one spared from prosecution. The issuing of judgments against the government 
is an important proxy for judicial independence as has been highlighted by Julio Rios-
Figueroa (2006:12), Helmke (2002), Ramseyer and Rasmunsen (2003) and Laryczower et al 
2002. This indicator was therefore explored. Based on this assessment it was revealed that 
the judiciary in Zambia does not functioned independently. In high profile cases where the 
state or senior government officials have a vested interest, courts usually issue judgments in 
                                                     
18
It refers generally to the system of checks and balances that exist between judicial, legislative and executive 
branches of government, but also to the ability of monitoring agencies or institutions such as anti-corruption 
commissions, ombudsman’s offices and others to compel cooperation from the government officials they are 
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their favour. The Bertelsmann Index County Report of 2010 on Zambia points out that ‘the 
more politically important a case is, the more court rulings are prone to political interference 
by the government’. Though the report further highlights, that it should be noted that 
political interference by the government happens in a few crucial cases. 
 
In these crucial cases it appears that the outcome of judicial cases is a factor of who holds 
the realms of power. For instance Chiluba was found guilty of having misapplied funds in a 
London high court decision. The case was due to be registered in Zambia during the reign of 
Levy Mwanawasa. The current government of Mr Banda has made it clear that it is not 
within its interests to register this case. Those within the judicial system have proceeded 
with this advice and the case has been buried despite public outcry (The Post Newspaper19). 
Equally Chiluba’s wife Regina who was found guilty of receiving stolen goods in a Magistrate 
Court has now appealed to a higher court and has been acquitted. The state has also been 
quick to enter into Nolle-prosequi(s)20 in cases of interest. Kashiwa Bulaya a relative of the 
late President’s (Levy Mwanawasa) wife misused public funds when he was Permanent 
Secretary under the Ministry of Health. The state entered a Nolle-prosequi and withdrew the 
case. The case was only resumed after pressure from the media. Mr Bulaya is now serving a 
five year jail sentence.  
 
Evidence of lack of judicial independence also surfaced recently when the MMD National 
Secretary lamented that the former Finance Minister Ngandu Magande would not have won 
his election had it not been for state assistance (Post Newspaper21).These sentiments were 
uttered in a bitter exchange of words through the papers with the former Finance Minister 
whose parliamentary seat was determined through the courts. Mr Magande was Member of 
Parliament for Chilanga constituency. It is difficult to explicitly attribute a given judgement to 
                                                     
19
 Data source: http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=12899 
 
20 This is a legal Latin term meaning we "we shall no longer prosecute," which is a declaration made to the 
judge by a prosecutor in a criminal case (or by a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit) either before or during trial, meaning 
the case against the defendant is being dropped (http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Nolle+prosequi) 
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state interference but most of the judgements involving the state or high profile individuals 
have not gone in the publics favour.   
 
4.3.2 Overtime Analysis of Judicial Autonomy  
 
The rule of law has not been upheld. As demonstrated above the law has been selectively 
applied in most cases. As such there has not been any progress with regards to judicial 
autonomy. In high profile cases where the state or senior government officials have a vested 
interest courts usually issue judgments in their favour. It appears as if the outcome of 
judicial cases is influenced by those who hold the realms of power. The changing of 
approach with regards to Chiluba’s corruption cases due to a change of government 
illustrates this point22. The judiciary has fallen short of providing horizontal accountability 
due to its lack of independence. There have been several instances of the executive arm of 
government exerting influence on the judiciary.  Former Permanent Secretary (PS) in the 
Ministry of Health Kashiwa Bulaya was one such case of attempted state influence. It is 
difficult to establish when the state is interfering with judicial processes because these acts 
are done away from the public eye. Despite this the people have an expectation of justice 
and transparency to prevail in all instances including high profile cases. 
 




The legislature as the supreme law making body is an integral part of any democracy. A well 
balanced legislature enhances horizontal accountability and provides an opportunity for the 
people to govern through their representatives. The legislature is essential in providing 
checks and balances on other arms of government and more precisely on the executive. 
                                                     
22
 It is widely viewed that cases against Chiluba were dropped for political reasons. Ruling party support is 
viewed to be declining in the province that Chuilba’s hails from. Cases were dropped to allow for Chiluba to 
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Through the legislature, citizens should be able to petition government in between elections 
using their elected representatives. Polity data on Zambia (2008) indicates that although the 
constitution gives the National Assembly substantial powers, in practice it has historically 
provided only limited check on presidential authority. In the initial years after Zambia 
revered back to multiparty democracy the  legislature’s oversight functions over government 
were limited as it was dominated by the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD).However in the 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections the opposition 
combined vote won the majority of  seats (refer to Table 4). This presented a perfect 
opportunity for the legislature to effectively assert its oversight functions.  
 
Unfortunately this was not to be but was in-fact the beginning of a new era of floor crossing. 
This was characterised by Members of Parliament (MPs) leaving the opposition to join the 
ruling party due to a desire for ministerial positions. Notable figures like the United Party for 
National Development (UPND) shadow finance minister crossed the floor to join the MMD as 
Minister of Finance. Other notable floor crossers from UPND were Benny Tetamashiba (late) 
appointed as Minister of local government and Jonas Shakafuswa appointed Deputy Minister 
of Finance. MMD managed to take control of the House through this scheme.  
 
Over the years parliament has been a rubber stamp of the government as parliamentarians 
have voted based on personal needs and not to represent the voice of the electorate. The 
Bertelsmann Index County Report on Zambia (2010:7) states that the legislature has rarely 
overturned executive decisions. In 2010 the government tabled the Anti Corruption Bill 
aimed at removing the abuse of office clause. Despite public outcry members of the ruling 
party together with some opposition ‘rebel members’23 voted in favour of the Bill. In some 
instances when members of the opposition have been suspended by their parties for siding 
with the ruling party the speaker has ignored the suspensions and has not declared the seats 
vacant.  
 
                                                     
23
 The Patriotic Front has identified members that are in a habit of disregarding party positions and siding with 
the ruling party. These have been labelled as ‘rebel members of parliament’. The party has assured the public 
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4.4.2 Overtime Analysis of Legislative Autonomy 
 
The legislature is another arm of government that has fallen short of the role it is expected 
to play in a democracy. The Legislature has not ensured an effective system of checks and 
balances on the exercise of government authority. Zambian legislators have put self, before 
service and engaged in floor crossing. The sole aim of such activities is personal benefit at 
the expense of national interest. The government has not been made accountable to the 
electorate for periods in between elections owing to an inadequate legislature. Over the 
years parliament has been a rubber stamp of the government. Parliamentarians have voted 
based on personal needs and not to represent the voice of the electorate. An illustration is 
the Anti Corruption Bill which was passed despite public outcry. The Bill proposed to remove 
the abuse of office clause from the original Anti corruption law. 
 




The powers of the Executive are provided for by the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia. 
The constitution represents the basic structure of any organized society. The constitution 
provides a commitment to democracy and to government with the consent of the governed 
(Ndulo and Kent 1996:1). The constitution is very important in advancing self government if 
it is produced through broad based consensus. It is further supposed to be legitimate, 
credible, enduring and guaranteeing rights and freedoms (ibid). The constitutional making 
process and resulting constitutions in Zambian unlike in other countries has been marred 
with problems. For instance the constitution does not guarantee any basic rights though it 
contains these. This means that rights are not enforceable and consequently one cannot 
hold the government accountable for not ensuring these basic rights.  
 
Furthermore the constitution grants the executive arm of government immense powers. The 
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Zambia 2008). Most of the laws that give unwarranted powers to the Executive were part of 
the founding constitution which was derived from colonial laws. In a colonial dispensation 
there would have been a need to have immense power over the colony but not in a 
democracy. There have been several attempts to change the constitution.  The Zambian 
constitution has been changed four times from 1964 with a fifth one on the way. The 
National Constitutional Conference (NCC) responsible for developing a new constitution was 
underway in 2008, although it was boycotted by elements of civil society and the opposition 
(Freedom House 2010). This was because the government refused to consider the 
constituent assembly method of adopting the constitution which was perceived by the civil 
society to be more inclusive than the use of parliament. Previous changes to the constitution 
have been effected without wide spread participation of the people, and the changes are 
mostly intended to serve the short-term political interests of those in power. For instance 
the Constitution was changed in 1996 to prevent Kenneth Kaunda from contesting election. 
 
The country has amended the constitution so many times because amendments only require 
a simple 2/3 majority in parliament which the ruling party always mobilises, through its 
manipulations of the legislature. The draft constitution is yet to be tabled before parliament 
whose independence remains highly questionable. Ndulo and Kent (1996:2) state that the 
constitution is no ordinary law to be modified or replaced by ordinary legislation. The 
constitution must be perceived as a higher law, authorizing and governing law and 
commanding adherence to constitutional precepts. ‘While ordinary law may be adopted and 
altered by legislative majorities of whatever size, the adoption of a constitution and its 
amendment requires much more, wide spread participation by the citizenry and the 
achievement of broad-based consensus’ (ibid 1962:2).  Unless Zambia adopts a constitution 
through broad based consensus which should include putting more rigorous procedures for 
amending the constitution, the populace will continue to be manipulated by those in the 
corridors of power. The executive power needs to be limited or at least put in check if 
aspects of good governance are to be upheld. Vertical and horizontal accountability will be 
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4.5.2 Overtime Analysis of Executive Power 
 
The executive maintains substantial powers. Therefore there has not been an overtime 
progress with regards to limiting the powers of the Executive. As outlined by the Polity 
Country Report on Zambia of 2008, the powers of the Executive as provided for by the 
Constitution of the Republic of Zambia grants the Executive immense powers and authority 
within the Zambian political system. Laws from colonial rule that give unwarranted power to 
the Executive continue to exist within a democracy. Attempts to change the constitution 
have yielded no results as procedures to change the Constitution do not favour meaningful 
change.  Zambia needs a new constitution adopted through broad consensus such as the 
constituent assembly method. Unless Zambia adopts a constitution through broad based 
consensus which should include putting more rigorous procedures for amending the 
constitution, the populace will continue to be manipulated by those in the corridors of 
power. The executive power needs to be limited or at least put in check if aspects of good 




Openness relates to whether the functioning of government is accommodating and 
transparent.  This section firstly assesses the extent the extent to which the public are 
allowed access to in formation and whether private and public media bodies operate freely. 
Furthermore, the analysis on transparency examines if there is honest and prudent use of 
public resources by those entrusted with the responsibility. This Section is therefore 
arranged into two sub-sections namely; Freedom of speech and information (media) and 
transparency and corruption discussed below. 
 
4.6.1 Freedom of speech and information (Media) 
 
Freedom of speech and information is essential to providing checks and balances on those in 
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provides insight on how the state is being run. This information should in turn be made 
available to the public. An integral part of this process is the media, which should ideally be 
independent in a democratic state. The media should be allowed to operate freely in the 
advancement of rights and civil liberties. The media if used ‘properly’24 works as a medium 
through which individuals can receive information and also serves as a means through which 
individuals can acquire knowledge.  
 
The media legislative framework in Zambia has not entirely promoted the existence of free 
media. This is because aspects within the law still remain unchanged from that which was 
inherited from colonial rule. For instance section 53 of the penal code empowers the 
President to ban a publication in his absolute discretion (Media Institute of Southern Africa 
(MISA Zambia). This piece of legislation has been used by the state to intimidate privately 
owned media. One example Omega TV a private television station which was repeatedly 
closed in 2004 by armed police officers (Freedom House 2004 Report). Despite these actions 
by the state Afrobarometer data shows that Zambian respondents support an open media 
that is critical of the state. Respondents were asked in the 2009 which of the following 
statements was closest to their view? Statement A or Statement B. 
 
A: The news media should constantly investigate and report on corruption and the mistakes 
made by the government.  
B: Too much reporting on negative events, like corruption, only harms the country. 
Most of the respondents reported that news media should constantly investigate and report 
on corruption and the mistakes made by the government as show in Figure below. 
 
Figure 5: Support for Media 
                                                     
24
 The media can also be used as a medium for propaganda in order to deceive the masses this is usually 

















The government has done very little to live up to the expectations of the people. The 
Freedom of Information, Broadcasting, and Independent broadcasting Authority draft laws 
of 2003, which were supposed to facilitate easier access to information held by government 
official organs, was abruptly withdrawn citing national security reasons. Even after 45 years 
of independence and with the rest of the world moving towards open governance, 
transparency and accountability, the state has opted for secrecy and non transparency for 
public institutions in Zambia. This allows the continued existence and application of such 
retrogressive colonial legislation as the ‘Official Secrets Act of 1923 which criminalises access 
and possession of public information with a minimum sentence of 25years ‘(MISA Zambia 
2010).The draft law was also supposed to transform the state-owned Zambia National 
Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) from a government propaganda organ to a public 
broadcaster, and to establish an independent regulator to regulate broadcasting.  
 
 What was later presented to parliament owing to pressure from private media organisations 
was not the initial bill that had earlier been tabled. The aspect of freedom of information 
which was supposed to facilitate access to information was conspicuously missing. When the 
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and civil society with regards to the interpretation of who should appoint the management 
boards of Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) and the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority, which regulates the industry and grants licenses to prospective 
broadcasters. Government eventually won the case at Supreme Court level and as such the 
ruling left the appointments largely in the hands of the government (Freedom House, MISA 
Zambia). This ruling not only gives government indirect control over private media, but also 
serves as a means to strengthen state control over ZNBC. From a legislative perspective, the 
country has retrogressed as it seems laws are continuously made to strengthen already 
existing controls of the media as opposed to advancing a free media. For instance the 
electoral act of 2006 which was passed prior to the elections prohibited the reporting of 
‘speculative analysis, unsourced opinion polls, and predictions of the result before the 
official announcement’ (Amnesty International Report 2008).  
 
The widest media circulations are those that are owned by the government namely, Zambia 
Daily Mail, Times of Zambia and Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). With an 
exception of the print media, state owned media is relatively cheaper than private owned 
media owing to government subsidies. Coverage at state-owned media outlets is generally 
supportive of the government, and as a result of prepublication review at government-
controlled newspapers, journalists commonly practice self-censorship. For instance during 
the run-up to elections in 2001, the government increased press-freedom abuses. State-
funded media were monitored and harshly warned (Freedom House 2003 Report).With the 
wide circulation of government media and biased coverage the state owned media serves as 
an effective propaganda tool for the government.  
 
The government has made several attempts to try and restrict the independent media 
(Bertelsmann Index County Report Zambia: 2010) and these attempts have sometimes 
focussed on increasing their cost of production. In March 2007, the government passed an 
amendment to the Value-Added Tax Act that would have increased the standard rate 
applicable to the supply of newspapers and magazines and raised the costs of production by 
25 percent (Freedom House). Though the amendment was later withdrawn after protests 
from local media organizations, the cost of independent media production still remains 
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that Internet access though not provided freely remains unrestricted by the government. In 
fact, Internet access has increased over the years from 2% of the population25 as of 2005 to 
4.3 % of the population in 2009. 
 
The state continues to have a strong hand (or at least attempts to do so) in the regulation of 
media. Media outlets that are critical of the state are constantly harassed by the state 
through state security wings. One of the frequently used tools of harassment has included 
criminal libel suits and defamation suits. This is because Section 69 of the penal code 
provides that it is a criminal offence for any media outlet to defame the president. For 
instance sections of the media that have widely exposed acts of corruption within the media 
have been constantly charged using the provisions of section 69 of the penal code. An 
example are, criminal charges brought against two Post newspaper journalists and two 
political figures in 2001  on charges of defaming the then President Frederick Chiluba in an 
article accusing the president of misappropriating $4 million the government had earmarked 
for emergency food imports several years ago(Freedom house Report 2002). 
 
Media violations have been on the increase in Zambia. In January 2003, three journalists 
from the independent biweekly The Monitor were arrested and another went into hiding 
after the paper published a story accusing the president's brother of corruption (Amnesty 
International Report 2003).In May 2005, the government attempted to expel a columnist 
from the independent daily The Post, announcing his deportation order on state television. 
The reporter, a British citizen with permanent residency in Zambia, had written a satirical 
article that officials characterized as insulting to the president. A court eventually annulled 
the deportation order as unconstitutional (Freedom House Report 2005).The government 
had attempted to limit live Q-FM broadcasts in the past, particularly in the period leading up 
to the 2006 general election. In November 2006, Radio Lyambai, a radio station based in 
Mongu was banned from broadcasting live call-in shows because the station was ‘becoming 
a platform for confrontation, controversies, and a channel of insults and misinformation’ 
(Mike Mulongoti-Minister of Information and Broadcasting).  
 
                                                     
25
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Reporters continued to face threats and physical assaults at the hands of police and ruling 
party supporters. In June 2006, Anthony Mukwita was summoned by police and warned of 
potential sedition charges after he read a facsimile critical of the government during his talk 
show on Radio Phoenix. In November, police arrested (and later released) Fred M'membe-
editor in chief of The Post, Zambia's only private daily- after accusing him of criminally 
defaming Mwanawasa in a series of vitriolic editorials; M'membe had been formally warned 
in July after protesting the constitutional review process.  
 
These abuses have also been extended to newspaper vendors selling The Post who are 
constant targets of attacks. In addition, police detained at least six journalists and beat 
others covering a demonstration (Freedom House Report 2006). Further abuses include the 
arrest and detention of a catholic priest, who was station manager of Radio Ichengelo, a 
catholic-owned radio station after the station aired a live call-in program which was viewed 
to have been inciting unrest in the aftermath of the 2008 elections. Editors from the Post 
newspaper are currently going to court on charges of circulating obscene materials. This was 
after the newspaper ‘brought to the attention’26 of the Vice President pictures of a woman 
giving birth at University Teaching Hospital whose delivery was unattended to owing to the 
strike by medical staff.  
 
An assessment of current abuses as produced by Media Institute of Southern Africa- Zambia 
(MISA Zambia) reveals 22 media violations reported in 2008 compared to seven in 2007. 
According to MISA Zambia, this was the highest number of media violations in the SADC 
region during the period (MISA Zambia Report 2009). Therefore, it seems that even though 
these violations may not be unique to Zambia, they are certainly more rampant within this 
state. Despite these Media abuses, citizens in general remain highly opposed to such actions. 
 
To date media regulation remains contentious. While groups within the industry made 
progress toward establishing a self-regulatory body in 2010, some government officials 
favour statutory regulation (MISA Zambia 2010). In August, the government threatened to 
                                                     
26
 The pictures in question were not published and were further not produced by the newspaper but were 
instead brought to the media outlet by the irritated husband of the woman who gave birth unattended to in 
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introduce a bill to regulate the media if it failed to come up with its own regulatory body. 
The independent press and media continued to deteriorate in 2010. The government and 
ruling party aggressively harassed and interfered with press outlets deemed opponents of 
the administration, specifically the leading independent newspaper, the Post. As of July 
2009, the Post’s staff had been physically or verbally attacked by MMD members on several 
occasions (Freedom House 2010). Supporters of the ruling Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy beat up Post photographer Thomas Nsama in retaliation for the paper’s 
reporting on the president. In February 2010, a group of 11 plainclothes police officers beat 
and pepper-sprayed Post photographer Abel Mambwe and detained him with reporter 
Mutuna Chanda after he photographed them assaulting an unlicensed taxi driver.  
 
The Table below (Table 3) shows Freedom of the press in Zambia as assessed by Freedom 
House. 
 
Table 6: Freedom of the Press in Zambia 
 













2002 22 24 19 65 Not Free 
2003 20 24 19 63 Not Free 
2004 19 24 20 63 Not Free 
2005 20 25 20 65 Not Free 
2006 19 24 21 64 Not Free 
2007 19 24 21 64 Not Free 
2008 20 24 20 64 Not Free 
2009 20 25 20 65 Not Free 
2010 19 25 20 64 Not Free 
*Source Freedom House-‘Freedom Press rankings’ 
* The degree to which each country permits the free flow of news and information determines the classification of its 
media as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having free media; 31 to 60, Partly Free 
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Zambia received a total score of 64 in 2010 which is not the countries best score. Periods 
before this reveal slight fluctuations in both positive and negative directions. Looking at the 
data above, one cannot out-rightly conclude that rankings have improved overtime as they 
have been positive and negative fluctuations with the most recent score of 2009 ranking 
among the countries worst. What can be deduced is that the country remains ‘Not Free’ 
which raises the need to put mechanisms to improve this ranking.  
 
4.6.2 Transparency and corruption  
 
Central to the idea of democracy is good governance which among other things entails 
prudent use of state resources. Most states have an established institution to provide 
horizontal accountability and ensure that all institutions acting in the interest of the people 
are devoid of any wrong doing. In Zambia the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) which was 
established in 1980 under an Act of Parliament (the Corrupt Practices Act No. 14 which has 
since been repealed and replaced by the Anti-Corruption Commission Act, No. 42 of 1996) is 
entrusted with this responsibility. Zambia Ranks 99 of 180 countries in the world rankings on 
corruption provided by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 2010 Index.  
 
There has been a mixed approach to the fight against corruption in Zambia from sporadic 
efforts targeted at fixing political opponents to window dressing for the donor community 
(Post Newspaper27). One such example is outlined in the Bertelsmann Index County Report 
on Zambia of 2010 which states that Mwanawasa’s ‘anti-corruption policy, which he 
announced at the beginning of his first term, lost credibility because hardly any of the 
corruption charges against leading members of the former Chiluba government have been 
successfully concluded’. In general the whole approach to fighting corruption is similar to 
what Carothers (2002:16) termed as ‘weak governmental accountability’. No real attempt 
has been made to rid the vice of corruption, whose roots in some cases are culturally 
embedded, to a point where corruption is now perceived to be a means of efficiency. For 
instance in the second republic under the reign of Frederick Chiluba it was common for 
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government officials and civil servants to openly demand a bride in order that they render a 
service in good time. According to the Heritage House's Index, ‘officials dealing with the 
public frequently demand illicit payments with impunity’. One of the problems is that 
corruption in Zambia appears to be ‘cultural’28.  
 
Corruption has also flourished due to lack of institutional capacity. Investigative units lack 
authority and personnel (Heritage House's Index). For instance in Mwanawasa’s reign a 
parallel institution form the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) called the Task Force on 
corruption was established due to a lack of confidence in the ability of the Anti Corruption 
Commission to pursue cases against the former president. The Task Force was mainly 
composed of private lawyers and private prosecutors. The appointment of people from the 
private sector would suggest that the institution lacked internal capacity or that it had not 
been impartial during the time of Chiluba and would therefore be sympathetic to him.  
 
Added to the cultural and institutional crisis is the lack of political will to address corruption. 
The intensity with which the fight against corruption is carried out seems to be the preserve 
of the incumbent. The fight against corruption seems to be driven by the good will of the 
incumbent and not properly laid down laws of good governance. Institutions are not 
properly empowered to preside over corruption matters free from political interference. An 
example of corruption being the good will of the incumbent is the sudden halt to cases of 
corruption against Chiluba and his administration. The current President, Rupiah Banda has 
abandoned the cases against former president Frederick Chiluba. A 2007 British high court 
judgment against Chiluba’s corruption charges has not yet been registered or enforced in 
Zambia. As earlier alluded the President had made it clear that he has no intensions of 
registering the judgment (Post Newspaper)  
 
Another corruption trial that was ongoing in the Zambian high court in August 2009 found 
the former president Chiluba not guilty of embezzlement charges after Rupiah Banda 
assumed office. When the head of a special task force on corruption attempted to appeal 
this ruling, he was dismissed from his position. The President had made it clear that the 
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government will not appeal the judgement and the subsequent dismissal of the Chairman of 
the Task force reaffirmed this position. The President has countered scepticism over his 
administration’s commitment to anti-corruption efforts by launching an official Anti-
Corruption Policy in July 2009. Despite these false assures in 2010 the government enacted 
legislation that removed the ‘Abuse of Office’ clause from the Anti-Corruption Commission 
Act, No. 42 of 1996 (Post Newspaper29).This is perceived to be among the pieces of 
legislation that provided the basis for prosecuting Chiluba’s acts of corruption. The removal 
of the clause speaks volumes about the governments intentions while in office. 
 
The government has continued to engage in miscellaneous dealings. The government 
awarded a tender to RP Capital a South African Consortium to oversee the sale of the 
Zambia Telecommunications Company (Zamtel) without tender procedures. After opposition 
from a wide section of Zambians a judicial tribunal was instituted that found that the process 
followed was irregular. The telecommunications Minister Dora Siliya a close ally of the 
President was forced to resign in April 2009 after being found guilty by a judicial tribunal of 
inappropriate behaviour. However, a high court ruling overturned the verdict, and the 
minister was subsequently re-appointed to a cabinet position. 
 
There have also been revelations of abuse of public funds within the health sector. Public 
funds including the global funds provided by donors were abused. The Auditor General’s 
(AG) report issued in early 2009 stated that huge sums of money had been lost in 2007 
through misuse, theft, and misappropriation of public resources .After these revelations of 
millions of dollars having been embezzled from the ministry of health, the Swedish and 
Dutch governments both suspended funding to the health sector (Lusaka Times30). 
 
4.6.3 Overtime Analysis of Openness  
 
                                                     
29
 Data Source: http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=14010 
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The government in Zambia has not embraced an open and transparent approach.  The 
Legislative framework has not entirely promoted the existence of free media. This is because 
aspects within the law still remain unchanged from that which was inherited from colonial 
rule. For instance section 53 of the penal code empowers the President to ban a publication 
in his absolute discretion. The Official Secrets Act of 1923 which criminalises access and 
possession of public information with a minimum sentence of 25years still exists on the 
statutes. Section 69 of the penal code also provides that it is a criminal offence for any media 
outlet to defame the president. The Supreme Court has in the past emphasised that there is 
no place for such pieces of legislation in modern time. Progress towards a more free and 
democratic Zambian will be difficult to achieve with such legislative barriers. 
 
Afrobarometer studies have shown that Zambian’s support an open media that is critical of 
the state and this will have to be met for them to accept that the democratic system is being 
responsive. The government has done very little to live up to the expectations of the people. 
The Freedom of Information, Broadcasting, and Independent Broadcasting Authority draft 
laws of 2003, which were supposed to facilitate easier access to information, were curtailed. 
State-owned media are used for government propaganda and government media personnel 
are monitored. It would be prudent to provide equal access for all, in the interest of 
transparency. After all, the funds used for these institutions are public funds. 
 
The state continues to harass outlets that are critical of the state, through state security 
wings. The government and ruling party aggressively harassed and interfered with press 
outlets deemed opponents of the administration, specifically the leading independent 
newspaper, the Post. These abuses have also been extended to newspaper vendors selling 
The Post who are constant targets of attacks. One of the frequently used tools of 
harassment has included criminal libel suits and defamation suits. While groups within the 
industry made progress toward establishing a self-regulatory body in 2010, some 
government officials favour statutory regulation (MISA Zambia 2010). In August, the 
government threatened to introduce a bill to regulate the media if it failed to come up with 
its own regulatory body. Zambia received a Freedom House, freedom of the media score of 
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remains ‘Not Free’ which is not surprising given the government retrogressive positions on 
most aspects that grantee free media. 
 
Zambia’s Transparency International rankings on corruption remain high. The fight against 
corruption seems to have been included for the sole purpose of attracting donor support 
rather than out of the realization that the problem needs attention. There is constant lip 
service about the fight against corrupt but when the opportunity to fight corruption presents 
itself the contrary is done. The current President, Rupiah Banda has abandoned the cases 
against former president Frederick Chiluba. The British high court judgment against Chiluba 
has not been registered and may not be. The Anti-corruption policy in July 2009 may just be 
another policy document with no meaning. This is because the laws that define what 
constitutes corruption like the Anti-Corruption Commission Act, No. 42 of 1996 are being 
changed. The government has continued to engage in corrupt activities and the Zambia 
Telecommunications Company (Zamtel) saga is one such example. Public funds including 
donor funds have been abused. This has eroded donor confidence going by the Swedish and 
Dutch governments suspending of funding to the health sector. It is the ordinary Zambian 
who will be affected by this decision. Unlike those in the realms of power the majority of 
citizens only source of health care are the public health facilities. Those in the corridors of 
power will continue to fly themselves to South Africa when medical needs arise as is the case 
now.  
 
 4.7 Popular Legitimacy of Democracy 
 
4.7.1 Public evaluations of the state of governance  
 
A positive evaluation of the state of governance would suggest that democratic systems are 
well in place, and functioning to the expectations of the population. Therefore generally 
speaking this could denote satisfaction with ‘supply of democracy’31. Citizens’ evaluations 
and experiences of democracy provide an essential ‘insider or ground-up’ assessment of 
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 Bratton and Mattes (2007:194) define perceived democratic supply as a measure of satisfaction with the way 
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democracy, which may be absent from macro-level data or expert evaluations (Logan & 
Mattes 2010:5). Below, this study provides descriptive statistics based on Afrobarometer 
public opinion data on support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy and patience 
with democracy. A graph summarising the supply and demand for democracy is also 
provided.  This data seeks to present citizens (‘insider’) perspectives into the supply and 
demand of democracy as an important requisite in assessing democratic improvements or 
growth. 
 
5.1.5.1 Support for democracy 
Support for democracy was measured by asking the respondent which of the three 
statements below was closest to their own opinion? 
A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 
B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 
C: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. 
 





The graph above represents the frequency distribution. Support for democracy was declining 
steadily between the periods 1999 to 2005. However, in 2009, it rebounded sharply, and in 
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fairly high with at least over 64% of respondents overtime (1999, 2003, 2005 and 2009) 
preferring democracy to any other kind of government.  
 
5.1.5.2 Reject other forms of rule  
 
The rejection of other forms of rule is a cluster of rejection for military rule, of one-party rule 
and one-man rule. The respondents were asked to strongly approve or approve on one hand 
and disapprove or strongly disapprove on the other. The graphs below represent the 
strongly disapprove and disapprove categories merged together.  The frequency in 
percentages is reflected on the vertical axis. 
 





 The graph (Figure 7) above shows that from 1999 to 2009, Zambians have remained strongly 
committed to the rejection of all forms of authoritarian rule. Military rule is rejected the 
strongest despite Zambian people not having experienced it. Rejection for one man rule is 
also strongly rejected which can be explained in terms of the non democratic experience of 
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5.1.5.3 Satisfaction with democracy 
 
The graph below shows frequency distribution of overall satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in Zambia for a ten year period (1999-2009). 
 






The graph above shows that satisfaction with democracy has declined in the ten year period. 
In recent years 2005 and 2009 (over 50%) the majority of Zambians have remained 
dissatisfied with racy.  
 
5.1.5.4 Patience with democracy 
Patience with democracy was measured by asking the respondents which of the following 
statements was closest to their view? Statement A or Statement B. 
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B: If our present system cannot produce results soon, we should try another form of 
government. 
 






The Figure above (Figure 10) shows that Patience with democracy has plunged between 
2003 and 2009. Zambian people believe that if the present system cannot produce results 
soon an alternative form of government should be tried. 
 
5.1.5.5 Supply and Demand of democracy 
The graph below shows a summary of all the distributions for supply and demand of 
democracy 
 




















As earlier discussed support for democracy, rejection of all non democratic rule remains 
fairly the same overtime. From about 2003 patience with democracy has steadily declined 
with Zambian indicating that they were ready to try another form of government if the 
present system did not produce results soon. 
 
4.7.2 Overtime Analysis of Popular Legitimacy of Democracy  
 
In terms of supply and demand of democracy, support for democracy was declining steadily 
between the periods 1999 to 2005 (Afrobarometer). However, in 2009, it rebounded 
sharply, and in fact rose to the highest level recorded .The declining support for democracy 
could be due to a lack satisfaction with the way democracy works in Zambia. Satisfaction 
with democracy has declined in the ten year period. In recent years 2005 and 2009 the 
majority of Zambians have remained dissatisfied with democracy (Afrobarometer). The 
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dissatisfaction with the general supply of democracy. With declining support and 
dissatisfaction with the way that democracy works, one cannot comprehensively conclude 
that there is democratic growth. Supply of democracy and satisfaction with democracy are 
critical elements in citizens’ evaluations of whether there has been democratic growth.  
 
Zambians remained strongly committed to the rejection of all forms of authoritarian rule. 
Military rule is rejected the strongest despite Zambian people not having experienced it. 
Rejection for one man rule is also strongly rejected which can be explained in terms of the 
non democratic experience of Kaunda’s 27 year rule. Patience with democracy on the other 
hand has plunged between 2003 and 2009. Zambian people believe that if the present 
system cannot produce results soon an alternative form of government should be tried. It is 
not clear on what the alternative to the present form of government ould be. This could be 
a desire to change the party in government as opposed to other non democratic forms of 























68 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER 5: GENERAL FINDINGS 
 
The study will now provide a general overview of findings, in terms of its main research 
question, which is, does a within country, over time analysis of Zambia reveal that Zambia is 
becoming more democratic? Following the presentation of data, discussion and analysis this 
Chapter provides a summary of findings for each sub-concept. This is done by way of a rating 
on a scale of major progress, minor progress, no change, minor setback32, and major 
setback. The rating is influenced by the overtime data analysis and discussion provided 
above on each of indicator. This is presented firstly in form of a table (refer to Table 6 




















                                                     
32
 Democratic growth is expected to be incremental or at least should stay steady with repeated elections. 
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5.1 Summary of Findings  
Table 7: Summary of Findings  





Freedom of association Major Setback  
Freedom of assembly  Major Setback  
Civic Participation Minor Setback  
Political Participation  Minor progress  
PARTICIPATION OVERTIME  Major Setback 
 
COMPETITION 
Electoral Competition No Change  
JUDICIAL AUTONOMY Judiciary  No Change  
LEGISLATIVE AUTONOMY  
 
Legislature Minor Setback  




No Change  
OPENNESS  
 
Freedom of speech and information (Media) Minor Setback  
Transparency and corruption  Minor Setback 
OPENNESS OVERTIME  Minor Setback  
POPULAR LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRACY  
 
Public evaluations of the state of governance  
 



















The overall conclusion is that there has been a major setback with regards to participation.  
This conclusion was arrived at after an overtime assessment of each of the indicators of 
participation. As indicated in Table 6, both freedom of association and freedom of assembly 
suffered major setbacks. This is because despite domestic, regional and international 
objection the government has still proceeded and imposed tighter regulation through the 
NGO Act of 2009, thereby limiting freedom of association. This is a direct infringement of 
human rights as provided for by international human rights instruments and in conflict with 
democratic values. With regard to freedom of assembly the law is again being used to deny 
citizens this right. The guarantee of freedom of assembly remains a selective process which 
is determined by the police aided by colonial legislation. It is difficult to assemble freely in 
Zambia and more so if the cause motivating the gathering is not supported by the 
government. As observed by the Supreme Court justices the Public Order Act ‘has no place in 
a democratic society’ 
 
 Civic Participation experienced a minor setback because community participation declined 
for much of the period under review. The rating is minor because community participation 
rebounded in 2009 (from 54% in 2005 to 62%) but it waits to be seen whether it will be 
restored to its previous best (1999-72%). This may be related to the strict regulations that 
the government has imposed regarding freedom of assembly and freedom of association. 
Added to this the majority of Zambians have consistently not contacted elected officials 
overtime. The only progress recorded was with Political Participation.  There were overall 
fluctuations with regard to interest in discussing politics with the highest number of 
respondents (about 40%) in 2003 reported to having discussed politics. The reason for the 
minor progress indicated is because voting turnout as a proportion of population of 
registered voters has slowly been increasing from 1996 to 2006 (55.2%-70.77%) though a 
slump was recorded in 2008 to 45.43%. Turnout as proportion of population of voting age 
also, increased from 28.18% in 1996 to 55.75% in 2006 but also recorded a slump in 2008.  
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Mwanawasa was unexpected leaving most voters unprepared. Involvement in elections is an 
essential indicator of participation in the political process and voter turn-out is used to 




The overall conclusion is that there has been no change with regards to competition.  This is 
because there has not been any alternation in power Zambia from the second republic.  The 
MMD has presided over the affairs of the country from 1991 to date (2011) representing 20 
years of rule. Coupled with this the quality of elections has not improved overtime and an 
alternation in power is difficult to attain as the playing field has not been levelled. This is 
reinforced by peoples’ evaluations of elections which reveal that almost half of the 
respondents in the Afrobarometer’s recent studies (2005 and 2009) feel that elections are 
not free and fair.  
 
Opposition political parties also remain divided and their voting constituents are split on the 
lines of ethnicity. Since the opposition is divided and Zambia uses the first past the post 
system, the president can assume office with as little as 28.7% of the vote. Zambia continues 
to have minority Presidents and the government remains opposed to changing the system as 
the status quo works in their favour. Electoral laws are fraudulent and do not provide for 
equal campaigning opportunities. The state has repeatedly used public resources when 
running for election which are not available to the opposition. Besides this there are also 
legislative barriers to political competition aside from the freedom of assembly explained in 
Chapter 4. Recent changes to the Electoral Act No 12 of 2006, empowers the president and 
not the electoral commission to set the election date. This gives undue advantage to the 
ruling party.  
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The overall conclusion is that there has not been change with regards to judicial autonomy. 
This is because overtime, the Judiciary has failed to issue judgements against the state when 
it matters most. No improvement has thus been recorded. The rule of law has not been 
upheld as the law has been exclusively applied in most cases. The courts rarely issue 
judgments against the state or senior government official when it matters. It appears as if 
the outcome of judicial cases is a factor of who holds the realms of power. The changing of 
approach with regards to Chiluba’s corruption cases owing to a change of government 
illustrates this point. The judiciary has fallen short of providing horizontal accountability due 
to its lack of independence. There have been several instances of the executive arm of 
government exerting influence on the judiciary.  Former Permanent Secretary (PS) in the 
Ministry of Health Kashiwa Bulaya was one such case of attempted state influence. It is 
difficult to establish when the state is interfering with judicial processes because these acts 
are done away from the public eye. Despite this the people have an expectation of justice 
and transparency to prevail in all instances including high profile cases. 
 
5.1.4 Legislative Autonomy 
 
The overall conclusion is that there has been a minor setback with regards to legislative 
autonomy. This is because the gain  made by the electorate when they elect the majority of 
members of parliament from the opposition, to ensure checks and balances have been 
overturned due to floor crossing. The Legislature has not ensured an effective system of 
checks and balances on the exercise of government authority. Zambian legislators have put 
self, before service and engaged in floor crossing. The sole aim of such activities is personal 
benefit at the expense of national interest. The government has not been made accountable 
to the electorate for periods in between elections owing to an inadequate legislature. Over 
the years parliament has been a rubber stamp of the government. Parliamentarians have 
voted based on personal needs and not to represent the voice of the electorate. An 
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5.1.5 Executive Power  
 
The executive maintains substantial powers. Therefore there has not been an overtime 
change with regards to limiting the power of the Executive. The Executive as provided for by 
the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia is granted immense powers and authority within 
the Zambian political system (Polity Country Report on Zambia of 2008). Laws from colonial 
rule that give unwarranted power to the Executive continue to exist within a democracy. 
Attempts to change the constitution have yielded no results as procedures to change the 
Constitution do not favour meaningful change.  Zambia needs a new constitution adopted 
through broad consensus such as the constituent assembly method. Unless Zambia adopts a 
constitution through broad based consensus which should include putting more rigorous 
procedures for amending the constitution, the populace will continue to be manipulated by 
those in the corridors of power. The executive power needs to be limited or at least put in 




The overall conclusion is that there has been a minor setback with regards Openness. This is 
because freedom of speech and information (Media) has been hampered. The media 
legislative framework in Zambia has not entirely promoted the existence of free media. This 
is because aspects within the law still remain unchanged from that which was inherited from 
colonial rule. These pieces of legislation have been used by the state to intimidate privately 
owned media. The government has made several attempts to try and restrict the 
independent media and these attempts have sometimes focussed on using state organs such 
as the police and courts to harass private media. As such Zambia presently has the highest 
number of media violations in the SADC region (MISA Zambia Report 2009). 
 
From a legislative perspective, the country has retrogressed as it seems laws are 
continuously made to strengthen already existing controls on the media as opposed to 
advancing a free media. This is evident from the Electoral Act of 2006 which prohibits the 
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before the official announcement’ (Amnesty International Report 2008). Furthermore the 
Freedom of Information, Broadcasting, and Independent broadcasting Authority draft laws 
of 2003, which were supposed to facilitate easier access to information held by government 
official organs, was abruptly withdrawn citing national security reasons. Coverage at state-
owned media outlets is generally supportive of the government, and as a result of 
prepublication review at government-controlled newspapers, journalists commonly practice 
self-censorship.  
 
Added to the above there has been a mixed approach to the fight against corruption in 
Zambia from sporadic efforts targeted at fixing political opponents to window dressing for 
the donor community. There is no real attempt to rid the vice of corruption whose roots in 
some cases are culturally embedded to a point where corruption is now perceived to be 
means of efficiency. It is common for government officials and civil servants to openly 
demand a bride in order that they render a service in good time. Zambia Ranks 99 of 180 
countries in the world rankings on corruption provided by Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions 2010 Index. Corruption has also flourished due to lack of institutional 
capacity. Investigative units lack authority and personnel. The fight against corruption seems 
to be driven by the good will of the incumbent and not properly laid down laws of good 
governance. The current President, Rupiah Banda has abandoned the cases against former 
president Frederick Chiluba. The government has continued to engage in miscellaneous 
dealings as evidenced from the sale of irregular sale of Zamtel. There have also been 
revelations of abuse of public funds within the health sector resulting in the Swedish and 
Dutch governments both suspended funding to the health sector. 
 
5.1.7 Popular Legitimacy of Democracy 
 
Popular legitimacy of democracy experienced a minor setback. This is because the 
democratic system has not been responsive. The assessment is minor because the rejection 
of all forms of authoritarian rule remained strong. None the less support for democracy on 
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it rebounded sharply, and in fact rose to the highest level recorded .The declining support 
for democracy is coupled with a decline in satisfaction with democracy overtime. In recent 
years 2005 and 2009 the majority of Zambians have remained dissatisfied with democracy. 
The system therefore seems to be unresponsive to democracy demand and this has led to 
dissatisfaction with the general supply of democracy. With declining support and 
dissatisfaction with the way that democracy works, one cannot comprehensively conclude 
that there is democratic growth. Supply of democracy and satisfaction with democracy are 
critical elements in citizens’ evaluations of whether there has been democratic growth.  
  
5.2 Cross-Cutting Findings 
 
There are cross cutting observations which summarise the finding from the analysis of sub-
concepts.  These include a lack of good governance, deteriorating supply of democracy, 
compromised vertical and horizontal accountability and quality of elections. These are 
discussed and summarized below. 
 
5.2.1 Lack of Good Governance 
 
The general political landscape does not depict democratic growth. The government in 
Zambia have perpetuated acts that do not reflect good governance.  Laws have been 
changed to limit freedom as opposed to granting it.  Furthermore laws that are un-conducive 
to a free and democratic rule remain unchanged from that which was inherited from colonial 
rule. The government has intentionally allowed laws such as Section 53 of the penal code 
that empowers the President to ban a publication in his absolute discretion. The Official 
Secrets Act of 1923 which criminalises access and possession of public information with a 
minimum sentence of 25years and Section 69 of the penal code which also provides that it is 
a criminal offence for any media outlet to defame the president. Civil liberties are hampered 
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 Government has changed the law at every opportunity to impose more control as opposed 
to freeing institutions that promote the growth of civil liberties. The media is far from being 
free as the state continues to harass media outlets that are critical of its rule. This perhaps is 
what Levisky and Way (2002:8) observed in their analysis of ‘stalled transitions’ which 
pointed to the fact that in these countries civil liberties are frequently violated. According to 
Levisky and Way (2002:8) opposition politicians, independent judges, journalists, human 
rights activists, and other government critics are subject to harassment, arrest, and in some 
cases, violent attacks. 
 
Freedom of assembly leaves much to be desired and is equally limited by the Public Order 
Act. Political parties, individuals and CSOs are harassed under the disguise of the law. CSOs 
have generally been viewed as a threat to the state and therefore these manoeuvres are not 
surprising. What is unfortunate is that the very CSOs that the government is antagonising 
were a key success factor in overcoming the one party state. Carothers (2002:12) points to 
the fact that hope for aspiring democracies lies in civil society’s effective opposition to the 
regime. This will surely be more difficult to achieve given the current efforts aimed at 
limiting CSOs. 
 
The rule of law has not been upheld as the law has been exclusively applied in most cases. 
The courts rarely issue judgments against the state or senior government official when it 
matters. Corruption remains high and the fight against corruption seems to have been 
included for the sole purpose of attracting donor support rather than out of realization that 
the problem needs attention. The government has continued to engage in corrupt activities 
such as the Zambia Telecommunications Company (Zamtel) saga. Public funds including 
donors’ funds have been abused. This has eroded donor confidence going by the Swedish 
and Dutch governments suspending of funding to the health sector.  
 
5.2.2 Deteriorating supply of Democracy  
 
There has been a decline in public opinion of supply of democracy due to the fact that the 
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exhibited by the state. Support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy has declined 
between the periods 1999 to 2009. The system seems to be unresponsive to democracy 
demand and this has lead to dissatisfaction with the general supply of democracy. 
Furthermore patience with democracy has plunged between 2003 and 2009. Zambian 
people believe that if the present system cannot produce results soon an alternative form of 
government should be tried.  
 
It is not clear on what the alternative to the present form of government would be as 
Zambians remained strongly committed to the rejection of all forms of authoritarian rule. 
Military rule is rejected the strongest despite Zambian people not having experienced it. 
Rejection for one man rule is also strongly rejected which can be explained in terms of the 
non democratic experience of Kaunda’s 27 year rule. What is interesting to note is that 
community participation in meetings was slowly declining from 1999 until recently (2009). 
Community engagement is important in enhancing civic knowledge and allows for greater 
participation in the democratic process and should therefore be encouraged. Voter turn-out 
which as proportion of both registered voters and voting age has slowly been increasing 
from 1996 to 2006 (55.2%-70.77%). A slump was recorded in 2008 to 45.43% which could be 
due to the fact that the by elections following the death of Mwanawasa were unexpected 
leaving most voters unprepared.   
 
5.2.3 Compromised vertical and Horizontal Accountability 
 
At face value Zambia seems to have most of the institutions required of a functioning 
democracy. The Problem is that the institutions that are supposed to provide oversight on 
government are compromised. The Anti Corruption Commission (ACC), Judiciary and 
legislature are not totally independent of government influence. Thus their functions are 
compromised and they are therefore unable to live up to the people’s expectations. The 
legislature has failed to provide effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of 
government authority. Zambian legislators have put self, before service and engaged in floor 
crossing. The sole aim of such activities is personal benefit at the expense of national 
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between elections owing to an inadequate legislature. Over the years parliament has been a 
rubber stamp of the government as parliamentarians have voted based on personal needs 
and not to represent the voice of the electorate. Institutions like the ACC lack the expertise 
or resources to fight corruption which is wide spread. The powers of the executive need to 
be checked and these institutions strengthened if democracy is to flourish in Zambia. 
 
5.2.4 Quality of Elections 
 
Elections have not been competitive enough as opposition political parties remain divided 
and their voting constituents are split on the lines of ethnicity. The president using the first 
past the post has been allowed public office with as little as 28.7% of the vote. The ruling 
party has been opposed to changing to a 50% plus 1 system as they do not have majority 
support. Parliamentary elections have no bearing in the long run due to constant Floor 
crossing. Electoral laws are fraudulent and do not provide for equal campaigning 
opportunities. The state has repeatedly used public resources when running for election 
which are not available to the opposition. Besides this there are also legislative barriers to 
political competition aside from the freedom of assembly explained in chapter 4. Recent 
changes to the Electoral Act No 12 of 2006, empowers the president and not the electoral 




















79 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
The within country, over time analysis of democratic quality in Zambia reveals that Zambia is 
not becoming more democratic. The overall quality of democracy in Zambia has not 
improved overtime. Of the seven (7) sub-concepts used to measure democratic quality 
namely participation, competition, judicial autonomy, legislative autonomy, executive 
power, openness, and popular legitimacy of democracy. Only the indicator of political 
participation under the broader concept of participation showed signs of minor progress. 
Although a major setback with the overall assessment of the sub concept of Participation 
was revealed. There has not been any progress and therefore no change with regards 
competition, judicial autonomy and executive power. Minor setbacks were experienced with 
regard to openness, legislative autonomy, and popular legitimacy of democracy. 
 
There are a lot of irregular practices on the part of the state that ideally should not be part 
of a democratic dispensation. One cannot say with the evidence provided that Zambia is 
democratic or that there has been democratic growth. This is despite holding a series of five 
elections.  One cannot also conclude that democracy has generally been improving overtime. 
It is difficult to ascertain what aspects of the democratic process elections have re-enforced. 
This said Lindberg’s theory is still a useful tool in understanding democratic growth within 
emerging democracies. The only problem with the theory is that it relies on cross national 
data that in some cases have methodological biases. This in my view makes the theory 
susceptible to methodological biases that are a product of the sources of the original data. 
For instance Freedom House data does not give a methodological stipulation on how the 
changes in ranking occur. Instead it makes use of observations that might in themselves be 
the subject of the observer’s biases. An example from the data on Zambia is the 
improvement that was noticed with regard to civil liberties owing to what was termed as 
free and fair election of 2008. The question that arises is whether the election was free and 
fair and if so whether that development constitutes reason enough to indicate an 
improvement in civil liberties.  
 
There is also need for comparative political scientists to find a methodological comprise and 
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provided by experts, which form the basis of large comparative studies. Otherwise we will 
persist in calling non democracies, democracies. Logan and Mattes (2010:5) observe that it is 
difficult to assess who provides an accurate assessment of democracy between the ordinary 
citizen and the expert but that both are essential to fully understanding democracy today. 
The ordinary citizen cannot be alienated from democracy assessment yet at the same time 
be expected to contribute and exist within this environment. Democracy is a people centred 
approach which is supposed to be responsive to people’s needs. Zambia will continue to 
aspire towards democracy but will need to improve its supply of democracy.  
 
My analysis and subsequent finding based on the assessment above of the Zambian case 
study strongly implies that Lindberg’s theory does not hold. What would be important to 
note is that there is need to try and analyse democratic growth, ithin countries more 
closely taking note of the structures and function that are at play within these states. A 
critical interrogation of Lindberg’s findings in other country case studies would also prove to 
be a test on how applicable his theory is. As Zambia continues to aspire to develop, it is 
hoped that a more inclusive approach centred on democratic values will be embraced by 
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POST SCRIPT 
Subsequent to the cut-off date for my data collection, and after I had finished writing this 
thesis, the 2011 election finally produced an opposition victory.  The Patriotic Front led by 
Michael Chilufya Sata was voted into power in the elections held on the 20th of September 
2011.  This development does not largely affect my conclusion as the overall quality of 
democracy needs improvement as well as other areas of concern outlined above. Though 
the development is a welcome set in the nation’s strides towards a democratic state. The 
election of Michael Sata will not change the constitutional imbalances that promote 
enormous executive power that has provided the basis for dictatorial tendencies by past 
presidents. Neither will it change the high levels of corruption, strict media controls as well 
as other aspects requiring attention outlined above. What awaits to be seen is whether this 
will provide impetus for citizens to pressure the government to change the non democratic 
elements that have been a feature of the nation post 1991 elections. The newly elected 
government, civil society, citizens and international community should continue to work 
towards promoting institutions and structures that will allow a more democratic Zambia. 
Most indicators on perceived supply of democracy have continued to decline in recent years 
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